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ABSTRACT 
The South China Sea dispute is complicated in terms of its nature, 
the sovereignty issues of the islands, delimitation issues, resources utili-
zation as well as other matters concerning security (both traditional and 
non-traditional). In order to solve the dispute, cooperation is one of the 
main considerations. However, the practice has not been realized. 
In order to solve the dispute and promote cooperation in the South 
China Sea region, the author suggests that conserving and managing 
fishery resources could be established as a starting point. There are a 
great number of management means, institutions, and international in-
struments (such as conventions, treaties and arrangements), which have 
been developed to protect fish stocks. Nonetheless, these policies should 
be practiced in an integrated mechanism at the national, regional, and in-
ternational levels, so that the policy objectives could be accomplished. 
The South China Sea, the East China Sea, and Yellow Sea comprise 
a large marine ecosystem (LME) in East Asia. In other words, any 
change of the marine ecosystem could create a serious impact on other 
maritime areas. This paper suggests that a regional fisheries management 
organization is needed in order to conserve and manage the fishery re-
sources in the South China Sea, which could also influence other mari-
time areas. Furthermore, it is also the purpose of this paper that such a 
model could contribute the solution to the dispute in the South China 
Sea. 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
The South China Sea carries more than half of the world’s annual 
merchant fleet and lots of tonnage passes through the Straits of Malacca, 
Sunda, and Lombok, with the majority continuing on into the South Chi-
na Sea. Tanker traffic through the Strait of Malacca leading into the 
South China Sea is more than three times greater than Suez Canal traffic, 
and well over five times more than the Panama Canal.1 Unfortunately, 
the South China Sea is also the world’s most contested maritime area, 
and the interested parties include not just the claimant states, but also the 
region’s major trading nations (Australia, Indonesia, Japan, and South 
Korea) and the United States. 
 1.  GlobalSecurity.org, “South China Sea Oil Shipping Lanes,”http://www.globalsecuri-
ty.org/military/world/war/spratly-ship.htm. 
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Map 1: the South China Sea2
Because of this, some of the islands and straits have considerable 
strategic importance. Exercise of sovereign control over some of these 
islands presents the opportunity for gaining a central and commanding 
position in the region. For this reason, the Pratas Reef, the Paracel Is-
lands, and the Spratly Islands are the most important island groups in the 
South China Sea. The straits that separate these islands are important not 
only because restrictions upon passage would seriously disrupt interna-
tional commerce, but also because controlling them permits a country to 
have influence over a much larger area on either side of the strait. 
Apart from the transportation routes, marine resources are also the 
targets for those littoral states. Hydrocarbons are the most important and 
attractive non-living resources in the South China Sea.3 Many littoral 
states have occupied islands in the area in order to claim sovereign rights 
for possible exploration of oil and gas, as well as gaining more negotia-
 2.   http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/base-maps/south-china-sea 
 3.  According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, it is estimated that there 
are approximately 11 billion barrels (bbl) of oil reserves and 190 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of nat-
ural gas reserves in the South China Sea. Please refer to U.S. Energy Information Administra-
tion, “South China Sea,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, February 7, 2013, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf. 
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4 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
tion power in the future. Competition for these resources could conceiv-
ably trigger serious conflicts. 
On the other hand, so far as the living resources are concerned, the 
South China Sea is one of the most important and abundant commercial 
fisheries in the world. Shared stocks such as scad and mackerel, and 
highly migratory species such as tuna and tuna-like fish, are the most 
common commercial stocks in this region.4
The disputes in the South China Sea could be categorized into two 
parts: one is on the sovereignty of those island features, and the other is 
the maritime zones that could be claimed. It is understandable that the 
best way to solve the disputes might be delimiting boundaries so that the 
areas of sovereignty and jurisdiction could be clearly decided. However, 
such a situation is not always possible. It is mainly because negotiation 
and adoption of a maritime boundary between the related States is       
always focused on political considerations, and there are no well-
established laws for making such boundaries. Although it is recognized 
that an “equitable solution” is one of the most important principles in 
making a boundary. However, there are no definite elements which have 
been decided. The geographical and geological factors, the coastal 
length, the traditional fishing activities, the relative impact on the liveli-
hood, and the economic dependency are the considerations recognized in 
different cases. 
Under such circumstances, the joint development then could be 
treated as a way to solve the disputes. According to Article 74(3) and  
Article 83(3) of the 1982 the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS),5 both contain the term “provisional arrangements,”
which can be applied to a situation before the boundary lines are formal-
ly made. The term “provisional arrangement” could be interpreted to 
mean “joint cooperation,” which is a popular term that has been quoted 
and cited by the leaders of the parties in the South China Sea. However, 
 4.  “The average per capita consumption of fish in East and Southeast Asia during the 
period 2000-2003 was 26.1 kg/year. This is much higher than the world average of 16.3 
kg/year. False . . This reflects the importance of fish in food security, as well as the general 
preference for fish as a source of protein in the region.” Please refer to Pakjuta Khemakorn, 
“Sustainable Management of Pelagic Fisheries in the South China Sea Region,” United Na-
tions, November 2006, http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme _home/fellows_ 
pages/fellows_papers/khemakorn_0607_thailand.pdf. 
 5.  UNCLOS Article 74(3) provides “Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, 
the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to 
enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, 
not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be 
without prejudice to the final delimitation.” [italics added] 
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no practical exercises are realized. Lack of political will might be the 
reason.
It is not difficult to locate opportunities for joint cooperation in the 
South China Sea region. Joint military exercises, joint development on 
hydrocarbon resources, marine scientific research, marine environmental 
protection and fisheries cooperation are options to this end. To date, 
however, disputes surrounding possible hydrocarbon resources in the   
area and actions in favour of conservation and management of fishery     
resources have been delayed. Nevertheless, conservation and manage-
ment of fishery resources could be the starting point for cooperation in 
this region and could have a “spillover effect” into other areas of cooper-
ation.
In this respect, cooperating to manage and conserve fisheries re-
sources is especially significant because fish are migratory, and even 
some of them are highly migratory. Moreover, overfishing is a serious 
and pressing problem in the region. In this regard, a maritime boundary 
cannot entirely protect a state’s fishery resources from encroachment be-
cause fishery resources can migrate beyond the state’s jurisdiction, and 
overfishing beyond its borders could also have great impact on the fish 
stocks within its territorial boundaries. 
Therefore, a proper management mechanism, subject to natural 
conditions, is necessary for the coastal states to keep stocks at sustainable 
levels. This is especially important for the littoral states around the South 
China Sea. Because this region is a semi-enclosed sea,6 any change in the 
fishery policy-making could have far-reaching effects on the fishery re-
sources in this area. 
II. CONTESTING CLAIMS 
The South China Sea, with an area of more than one million nauti-
cal square miles, is not only the largest maritime area in the Southeast 
Asian region, but is also the 26th largest basin in the world. In terms of its 
geographic setting, the South China Sea is also a “semi-enclosed sea” 
bounded on the east by the Philippine Deep and the Pacific Ocean, on the 
west by the Sunda Shelf and the Indian Ocean, on the south by the Indo-
nesian archipelago, and on the north by the Taiwan Strait. The littoral 
states surrounding the South China Sea, in clockwise order, are Taiwan, 
 6.  UNCLOS Article 122 provides that “[E]nclosed or semi-enclosed sea” means a gulf, 
basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a 
narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic 
zones of two or more coastal States. 
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the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Cam-
bodia, Vietnam, and the PRC. However, six of them are the claimants 
who have overlapping maritime claims, including claims of sovereignty 
over certain land features and overlapping maritime area. They are Tai-
wan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, and the PRC.
A. China 
In their basic legal arguments, the two Chinese governments, i.e. the 
Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
have similar ground towards the islands in South China Sea, because 
they draw on the same historic evidence:7
1.   More than 2,000 years ago, Chinese people were already sailing 
on the South China Sea, as recorded in ancient Chinese litera-
ture. By the time of the Western and Eastern Han dynasties (206 
B.C.-220 A.D.), the South China Sea had become an important 
navigation route for the Chinese people.8
2.   In order to commemorate the reigns of the two Ming Emperors, 
Cheng-tsu (1403-1424 A.D.) and Hsuan-tsung (1426-1435 
A.D.), Yung-lo and Hsuan-teh were attached to the Paracels’ 
two sub-groups of islands, Amphitrite and Crescent.9
3.   In 1877, China’s first ambassador to Britain, KUO Sung-tao, 
made an official statement to express the Paracel Islands ‘be-
long to China.’10
4.   In 1883, Germany carried out surveys on the Paracel and Sprat-
ly Islands, but these surveys ceased after the Ching government 
protested.11
5.   According to the 1887 Sino-French ‘Convention Respecting the 
Delimitation of the Frontier between China and Tonkin,’ France 
 7.  Steven K. T. YU, “Who Owns the Paracels and Spratlys? – An Evaluation of the Na-
ture and Legal Basis of the Conflicting Territorial Claims”, Chinese Yearbook of International 
Law and Affairs, Vol. 9 (1989), pp. 5-6; Beijing Review (12 December 1975), quoted from 
Choon-ho Park, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 
1983, p. 212. For the history of Chinese people in the South China Sea, see John K. T. CHAO, 
“South China Sea: Boundary Problems Relating to the Nansha and Hsisha Islands,” Chinese 
Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 9 (1989), pp. 73-77; Marwyn S. Samuels, 
Contest for the South China Sea, Methuen: New York and London, 1982, pp. 9-50. 
8. Park, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, ibid.
 9.  Dieter Heinzig, Disputed Islands in the South China Sea: Paracels-Spratlys-Pratas-
Macclesfield Bank, Wiesbaden: O. Harrasowitz, 1976, p. 23. 
 10.  Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, supra note 7, p. 52. 
 11. Ibid.; CHAO, “South China Sea: Boundary Problems Relating to the Nansha and Hsi-
sha Islands,” supra note 7, pp. 76-77; Heinzig, supra note 9, pp. 25-26. 
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recognized that the Paracel (and Spratly) Islands were part of 
China.12
6. The Ching Dynasty’s first official patrol to the Paracels was 
launched in 1902 by three warships from its Canton fleet, which 
was led by Admiral LI Chun and Vice-Admiral WU Ching-
yung. During their stay on the Paracel Islands, they planted im-
perial flags and a stone tablet to commemorate the arrival of 
formal Chinese authority. This tablet was discovered in 1979 by 
the PRC’s People Liberation Army stationed on the North Is-
land.13
7.   After the Pratas incident of 1907,14 the second official patrol 
was launched in 1908 by a ‘Special Provincial Commission for 
the Management of the Area.’ The Commission was instructed 
to perform an official reconnaissance of the islands, and to es-
tablish sites for the construction of houses, roads, a radio sta-
tion, and phosphate processing plants. Upon their return after a 
one-month stay on the Paracels, the Commission submitted an 
Eight-Point-Program Report recommending, inter alia, the ad-
ministrative absorption and economic development of the Para-
cel Islands. This Report was later approved first by Governor-
General Chang of Guangdong, then by Kwan-Hsu Emperor, and 
finally, carried out by the Chinese government in 1911 by in-
corporating the Paracels into Guangdong Province, to be admin-
istered by the Prefectural Authority of Hainan Island.15
8.   The issuance and withdrawal of licenses for exploitation of the 
Paracel Archipelago: From 1921-1932, five such licenses were  
issued by the ROC Provincial government of Guangdong.16
9.   Early in 1928, the ROC government appointed a commission to 
investigate the Paracel Islands. On 22 May 1928, members of 
the commission boarded a navy battleship and sailed to the Par-
acels. Upon their return, they published a final report titled 
 12.  Hungdah CHIU and Choon-ho Park, “Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Is-
lands,” Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 3 (1975), pp. 11-13; Samuels, Con-
test for the South China Sea, supra note 7, p. 71. 
 13.  Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, supra note 7, p. 53. 
 14.  In 1907, a Japanese entrepreneur-adventurer named Nishizawa Yoshiji, together with 
one hundred followers, occupied Pratas Island and renamed it for himself. The occupation 
ended in 1908 when China paid Nishizawa an indemnity of 130,000 silver dollars and Japan 
formally recognized Chinese sovereignty over the Pratas group. See Samuels, supra note 7, p. 
53.
 15.  Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, ibid., pp. 53-54; YU, “Who Owns the Par-
acels and Spratlys?” supra note 7, pp. 5-6. 
 16.  YU, ibid., p. 6. 
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‘Text of the Report on the Investigation of the Paracel Archi-
pelago (Tiao-Cha Hsi-sha Chun-tao pao-kao shu).’ According 
to this Report, the whole area around the Paracels, especially 
Woody Island, had been investigated thoroughly.17
Therefore, both Chinese governments claim that the Paracel and 
Spratly Islands have always belonged to China in their entirety. This atti-
tude has been shown on several occasions, although never jointly. The 
following two sub-sections will discuss the two Chinese governments’
separate actions concerning the South China Sea after 1949. 
1.  The Republic of China (Taiwan) 
The ROC government was the first in the twentieth century to claim 
sovereignty over the Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, the Paracel      
Islands, and the Spratly Islands, basing its claim on the first discovery 
and used by the Chinese in the Western Han dynasty (in the first century 
BC).18 When the Spratly Islands were recovered by the ROC in 1946, the 
Guangdong Provincial government was granted jurisdiction over them.19
In 1947, the ROC Ministry of Interior’s subsequent proposal to the cen-
tral government to “transfer jurisdiction of the islands to the ROC Navy” 
was approved.20 In addition, an official map was released, which showed 
the Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, Paracel Islands, and Spratly       
Islands within the U-shape lines. 
In 1948, the ROC dispatched warships to the archipelago to conduct 
surveys and erect landmarks.21 In 1949, the ROC President promulgated 
the Organizational Statutes Governing the Office of the Special Adminis-
trator of Hainan and transferred the jurisdiction of the Spratly Islands 
from the Guangdong Provincial government to the Hainan Special Ad-
ministrative District.22 Owing to its defeat in the civil war in May 1950, 
the ROC government withdrew its forces from Hainan Island and the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands to Taiwan. In the 1952 Treaty of Peace      
between the ROC and Japan,23 Japan “renounce[d] all right, title, and 
claim to the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, and Maccles-
 17.  Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, supra note 7, pp. 57-60. 
 18.  Remarks by President Ma on Taiping Island, 28 January 2016. http://english.presid- 
ent.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=36616&rmid=2355. 
 19.  Government Information Office, ROC, “The Republic of China’s Sovereignty over 
the Spratly Islands,” Reference: ROC on Taiwan, No. RR-93-02, 30 April 1993, p. 2. 
20.  Ibid.
 21.  Pao-Min CHANG, “A New Scramble for the South China Sea Islands,” Contempo-
rary Southeast Asia, Vol. 12 (1990), p. 22. 
22. ROC, Government Information Office, Supra note 19. 
23.  United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 138, p. 38. 
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field Bank.”24 Although no sovereign successor was named in the Peace 
Treaty, the ROC claims that this Treaty is substantive proof that the ROC 
henceforth exercised complete sovereignty over these island groups.25
When, on May 15, 1956, a Philippine named Tomas Cloma claimed 
ownership over islands and reefs in the Spratly Islands by discovery and 
occupation, and subsequently declared the establishment of the “Free 
Territory of Freedomland,” the ROC government immediately protested 
to the Philippine government.26 A naval contingent was sent to patrol the 
Spratly Islands but found the Philippine had already left. Later a Taiwan-
ese garrison force of about 600 troops was sent to Taiping (also known 
as Itu Aba) Island, the biggest island in the Spratly Islands,27 and has re-
mained there since then.28 In 1990, the Executive Yuan granted jurisdic-
tion of Tungsha (Pratas) Island and Taiping Island to the Kaohsiung City 
government. They also established a postal system on the islands, and 
maintained them under the administrative system.29
2. The People’s Republic of China 
Chinese leaders of the PRC maintain that China has ‘undisputable
sovereignty’ over all the islands in the South China Sea. Although the 
PRC was not invited to attend the San Francisco Peace Conference in 
1951 and did not sign the Treaty of Peace with Japan, its Foreign Minis-
ter, ZHOU En-Lai, emphasised that30
 24.  See discussion in Gerardo M. C. Valero, “Spratly Archipelago Dispute: Is the Ques-
tion of Sovereignty Still Relevant?” Marine Policy, Vol. 18 (1994), p. 319. 
 25.  CHIU and Park, “Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands,” supra note 12, p. 
14.
 26.  Ministry of the Interior, Compilation of Historical Archives on the Southern Territo-
ries of the Republic of China, Taipei: Ministry of the Interior, 2015, pp. 130-133. 
 27.  Itu Aba Island is 1,301 meters long and 419 meters wide, the total area is about 0.51 
sq. km. See Southern Coastal Patrol Office, Coast Guard Administration, http://www.cga. 
gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=81498&ctNode=8140&mp=9991.  
28. Coast Guard Administration had taken over the garrison since its establishment on 28 
January 2000.
29. Ministry of the Interior, supra note 26, pp. 188-191. 
30.  Collected Documents on the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China,
Vol. 2 (Peking, 1961) p. 32. For discussion, see Valero, “Spratly Archipelago Dispute,” supra 
note 24, p. 319. 
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[T]he Paracel Archipelago and Spratly Island, as well as the 
whole Spratly Archipelago, and the Chung-sha (Maccles-
field Bank), and Tung-sha (Pratas) archipelagos have al-
ways been Chinese territory . . . The Central People’s Gov-
ernment of the People’s Republic of China declares 
herewith: The inviolable sovereignty of the People’s Re-
public of China over Spratly Island and the Paracel archi-
pelago will by no means be impaired, irrespective of 
whether the American-British draft for a peace treaty with 
Japan should make any stipulations and of the nature of any 
such stipulations. 
On September 4, 1958, in its Declaration on Territorial Sea, the 
PRC proclaimed that the Pratas Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Maccles-
field Bank, and the Spratly Islands belonged to it.31
The legal action taken by the PRC was on February 25, 1992, when 
it adopted the ‘Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone’ to
legalise its claim. This Law provides that the Dongsha Islands (the Pratas 
Islands), the Xisha Islands (the Paracel Islands), the Zhongsha Islands 
(Macclesfield Bank), and the Nansha Islands (the Spratly Islands) are a 
part of its land territory.32
The PRC declared that it would resort to any measure to solve the 
territorial issues with other littoral states in the South China Sea region. 
The PRC Premier, LI Peng, made it known in Singapore in 1990 that 
China was willing to shelve the sovereignty issue and co-operate with the 
concerned countries in Southeast Asia to develop the resources around 
the Spratly Islands.33 Likewise, the PRC President YANG Shangkun 
proposed in his ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
trip in June 1991 that there should be consultations among the rival coun-
tries for joint economic exploitation of the South China Sea. According 
to Yang, China ‘in due time,’ would be prepared to solve the dispute 
 31.  “Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea” in Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intel-
ligence and Research, US Department of State, Limits in the Seas, No. 43, Straight Baselines: 
People’s Republic of China, 1 July 1972. 
 32.  Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone, 25 February 1992, Article 2, see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATION- 
ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf. For the analysis of the Chinese territorial 
sea law, see Hyun-Soo Kim, “The 1992 Chinese Territorial Sea Law in the Light of the UN 
Convention,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 43 (1994), p. 894; Li-Yu 
WANG and Peter H. Pearse, “The New Legal Regime for China’s Territorial Sea,” Ocean De-
velopment and International Law, Vol. 25 (1994), pp. 431-442. 
 33.  Lai To LEE, “Domestic Changes in China Since the 4 June Incident and Their Impli-
cations for Southeast Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 13 (June 1991), p. 39. 
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over the islands ‘through friendly consultations with the other coun-
tries.’34
The PRC currently occupies the whole Paracel Islands and the fol-
lowing maritime features in the Spratlys: Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef, 
McKennan Reef, Hughes Reef, Johnson Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Mis-
chief Reef, and Subi Reef. 
B. Malaysia 
Malaysia did not claim any section of the Spratly Islands until 1978, 
when a senior Malaysian official visited and claimed a number of islands 
in the southern region of the Spratlys, including Amboyna Cay, Commo-
dore Reef, and Swallow Reef.35 The next year, maps published by Kuala 
Lumpur showed the continental shelves off the east coast of the Malaysi-
an peninsula, Sarawak, and Sabah as well as the boundary enclosing the 
Amboyna Cay, Commodore Reef, and Swallow Reef.36 In May 1983, 
Kuala Lumpur, for the first time, landed troops on the Swallow Reef and 
has since maintained a platoon of soldiers there.37 Since November 1986, 
two more platoons have been dispatched, one to Mariveles Reef and an-
other to Dallas Reef.38
The legal grounds for Malaysia to claim those islands are based on 
the following actions: Continental Shelf Act of 28 July 1966,39 Proclama-
tion of the Economic Zone of 25 April 1978,40 and Exclusive Economic 
Zone Act of 1984, Act No. 311.41
Malaysia considers those islands as a part of its territory. This atti-
tude can be seen in its document defending its action in garrisoning 
Swallow Reef. The Malaysian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on  
September 9, 1983 claiming that whilst “the Malaysian Government has 
34.  Straits Times (9 June 1991) p. 6. 
 35.  D. J. Dzurek, “Boundary and Resources Disputes in the South China Sea,” Ocean 
Yearbook, Vol. 5 (1985), p. 260. 
 36.  Alan J. Day, ed., Border and Territorial Disputes, London: Longman, 1982, p. 126. 
37.  Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 September 1983, pp. 40-41. 
38.  Straits Times, 29 June 1988, p. 11. 
 39.  Continental Shelf Act l966- Act No. 57 of 28 July l966, as Amended by Act No. 83 of 
1972, see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/MYS_ 
1966_Act.pdf. 
 40.  Proclamation of the Economic Zone of 25 April 1978, see http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/MYS_1978_Proclamation.pdf. 
 41.  Exclusive Economic Zone Act, 1984, Act No. 311 - An Act pertaining to the exclu-
sive economic zone and certain aspects of the continental shelf of Malaysia and to provide for 
the regulations of activities in the zone and on the continental shelf and for matters connected 
therewith, see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ 
MYS _1984_Act.pdf. 
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12 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
no claim whatsoever over the ‘Spratly Islands,’” the Swallow Reef “has 
always been and is part of the territory of Malaysia.”42 Moreover, accord-
ing to the Malaysian Continental Shelf Act of 1966, those islands and 
reefs are located within the continental shelf of Sabah, thus, Malaysia’s 
rights to them are a simple matter of geography. To reinforce such 
claims, Malaysia erected obelisks on the Louisa and Commodore reefs.43
Malaysia occupies Amboyna Cay, Commodore Reef, and Swallow 
Reef.44
C. The Philippines 
The Philippine government claim to sovereignty over the Spratly Is-
lands is based on occupation, which has been one of the important meth-
ods to seize sovereignty on a particular piece of terra nullius land since 
the nineteenth century. The Philippines considered the archipelago as a 
terra nullius till 1956 when a Philippine fisherman and navigator, Tomas 
Cloma, claimed discovery of the archipelago.45 Tomas Cloma, the owner 
of a fishing fleet and the Philippine Maritime Institute, set out with his 
brother and a crew of forty men to take formal possession of some of the 
Spratly Islands on May 11, 1956. They raised the Philippine flag on vari-
ous islands, most of them being the major islands of the Spratlys, includ-
ing Spratly Island, Taiping Island, Nam Yit Island, and Thi Tu Island. A 
few days later, he proclaimed their new possession as the “Archipelago 
of Freedomland (Kalayaan).”46 He emphasised that the claim was based 
on ‘rights of discovery and/or occupation,’ because those islands are out-
side Philippine waters and not within the jurisdiction of any country.47 In 
other words, res nullius naturaliter fit primi occupantis is Cloma’s view 
on the occupation of those islands. On July 6, 1956, Cloma declared the 
establishment of a separate government for the ‘Free Territory of Free-
 42. Statement of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, 9 September 1983. Similar attitude can 
be seen from Malaysian Foreign Ministry’s statement in 1988 after the armed conflict between 
the PRC and Vietnam. New Straits Times, 25 February 1988, cited from R. Haller-Trost, The
Spratly Islands: A Study on the Limitations of International Law, University of Kent at Can-
terbury, Centre of South-East Asian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 14, Kent: University of 
Kent, 1990, p. 65. 
 43.  Although it is believed that these monuments on Commodore Reef were destroyed by 
the Philippines authorities. See J. R. V. Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the 
World, London & New York: Methuen, 1985, p. 222. 
 44.  Cf. Haller-Trost, The Spratly Islands, supra note 42, pp. 67-70. 
 45.  From the Philippine point of view, the Spratly Islands were terra nullius because, in 
the 1951 Peace Treaty, Japan only renounced its rights to the islands, but did not specify recip-
ients of the abandoned title.
 46.  Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, supra note 7, pp. 81-82. 
 47.  Samuels, ibid., p. 82. 
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domland,’ with a capital at Pag-asa Island, and with himself as ‘Chair-
man, Supreme Council of State.’48
In response to Cloma’s proclamation, in December 1956, Filipino 
Vice-President Garcia announced the Philippine government’s position:49
 Insofar as the Department of Foreign Affairs is concerned, it 
regards the islands, islets, coral reefs, shoals, and sand cays 
comprised within what you call ‘Freedomland’, with the exclu-
sion of those belonging to the seven-island group known inter-
nationally as the Spratlys, as res nullius, some of them being 
newly-risen, others marked on international maps as uncharted 
and their existence doubtful, and all of them being unoccupied 
and uninhabited; which means, in other words, that they are 
open to economic exploitation and settlement by Filipino na-
tionals, who have as much right under international law as na-
tionals of any other country to carry on such activities, so long 
as the exclusive sovereignty of any country over them has not 
been established in accordance with the generally accepted 
principles of international law, or recognised by the interna-
tional community of nations. 
 As regards the seven-island group known internationally as 
the Spratlys, the Philippine government considers these islands 
under the de facto trusteeship of the victorious Allied Powers 
of the Second World War, as a result of the Japanese Peace 
Treaty, signed and concluded in San Francisco on September 
8, 1951, whereby Japan renounced all its rights, title and claim 
to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands, and there be-
ing no territorial settlement made by the Allied Powers, up to 
the present with respect to their disposition. It follows, there-
fore, that as long as this group of islands remain in that status, 
it is equally open to economic exploitation and settlement by 
nationals or any members of the Allied Powers on the basis of 
equality thereto.
 In view of the geographical location of these groups of is-
lands and islets embraced within ‘Freedomland’, their proximi-
ty to the western territorial boundaries of the Philippines, their 
historical and geological relations to the Philippine archipela-
go, their immense strategic value to our national defence and 
security, aside from their economic potential which is admit-
tedly considerable in fishing, coral and sea products, and in 
 48.  Ibid.
 49.  Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
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rock phosphate, assuredly the Philippine government does not 
regard with indifference the economic exploitation and settle-
ment of these uninhabited and unoccupied groups of islands 
and islets by Philippine nationals so long as they are engaged 
in furtherance of their legitimate pursuits. [emphasis added] 
The Philippines took an equivocal position in dealing with Cloma’s 
proclamation. In order to avoid any possible confrontation with other 
concerned states, Garcia combined ‘the seven-island group known inter-
nationally as the Spratlys’ with ‘Freedomland’ in order to imply that they 
were res nullius on the assumption that the status of the Spratly Islands 
was still undetermined. The Philippine attempt is understandable if we 
examine its geographical situation. The Philippines has virtually no phys-
ical continental shelf along its western coast. The 200-meter isobath line 
on the southeast running very close along Palawan and Luzon islands,50
which creates the ‘natural prolongation’ principle, is simply unhelpful to 
the Philippines if it wants to claim its jurisdiction over the Spratly Is-
lands. Thus, based on the theories of ‘occupation’ and ‘proximity,’ the 
Philippine government could be better placed to claim control over those 
islands.51 Obviously, Garcia’s announcement is a tactful arrangement for
any further claim in the future. 
On July 10, 1971, the Philippine government, claiming that an un-
armed Philippine vessel operating in the Spratly Islands had been fired 
upon by an ROC naval patrol unit,52 sent a diplomatic note to Taipei de-
manding the withdrawal of a Chinese garrison from Taiping Island on 
the grounds that:53
1. The Philippines has a legal title to the island group as a 
consequence of the occupation by Tomas Cloma; 
2. The presence of the Chinese forces in Itu Aba (Taiping 
Island) constituted a serious threat to the security of 
the Philippines; 
3. The Chinese occupation of some islands in the Spratly 
group constituted de facto trusteeship on behalf of the 
 50.  Park, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, p. 179. 
 51.  Milton Watler Meyer, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic, Honolulu, 
Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1965, p. 198; Diane C. Drigot, “Oil Interests and the Law 
of the Sea: the Case of the Philippines,” Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 12 
(1982), pp. 41, 44. 
 52.  Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, supra note 7, p. 89. 
 53.  “Government States Position,” New Philippines (10 July 1971), p. 10; Jorge R. Co-
quia, “Philippine Position on the South China Sea Issues,” in Theresa C. Carino, ed., The
South China Sea Disputes: Philippine Perspectives, Manila, the Philippines: Philippine-China 
Development Resource Center and Philippine Association for China Studies, 1992, p. 53.
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World War II allies which precluded the garrisoning of 
the islands without the allies’ consent;
4. The Spratly group is within the archipelagic territory 
claimed by the Philippines. 
This was the first time that the Philippines articulated an official 
claim to part of the Spratly Islands. 
On June 11, 1978, President Ferdinand E. Marcos declared Presi-
dential Decree No. 1599, which enclosed an area constituting a distinct 
and separate municipality of the Province of Palawan and which was to 
be known as Kalayaan.54 In addition, the Philippines also declared its ar-
chipelagic baselines by amending its relevant legislation.55
Manila has seven Spratly islands under its control: Flat Island, 
Lankiam Cay, Loaita Island, Nanshan Island, Northeast Cay, Thi Tu    
Island, and West York Island.56 Manila still maintains a runway on the 
Thi Tu Island. 
D. Vietnam 
Vietnam is situated on the eastern coast of the Indochina Peninsula, 
and has a 2,828 nm of coastline.57 Given this geographical location, it is 
easy to understand why Vietnam is eager to extend its claim on the vast 
maritime waters in the South China Sea. On October 21, 1956, the Re-
public of Vietnam (South Vietnam) assigned the Spratlys to Phuoc Tuy 
Province by Decree No. 143/NV.58 This was followed by two more de-
crees, No. 76/BNV/HC 9 ND of 21 March 1958 and No. 34/NV of 27 
January 1959, whereby the 1956 decree was either reconfirmed or ad-
justed.59 In order to counter South Vietnam’s claim, the government of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) supported the 
PRC’s claim to the Spratly Islands. Also on the occasion of the PRC’s 
declaration on territorial sea in 1958, the then Prime Minister Pham Van 
 54.  Philippine Presidential Decree No. 1599 of 11 June 1978 establishing an Exclusive 
Economic Zone and for other purposes, see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATION- 
ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/PHL_1978_Decree.pdf. 
 55.  For example, Republic Act No. 9522: An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Repub-
lic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Base-
lines of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes. Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 70 (2009), p. 32 
 56.  Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, supra note 43, p. 218. 
 57.  Mark J. Valencia and Jon M. Van Dyke, “Vietnam’s National Interests and the Law 
of the Sea,” Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 25 (1994), p. 217. 
 58.  CHIU and Park, “Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands,” supra note 12, p. 9. 
59.  Ibid.
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Dong again repeated this attitude.60 This statement by the North Viet-
namese government seriously weakened its position on its claim of sov-
ereignty over the Spratly Islands. 
The Vietnamese attitude to the Paracel and the Spratly island groups 
is that they have ‘from time immemorial’ been part of their territory. 
They argue that:61
From time immemorial, these islands have been frequented 
by Vietnamese fisherman who went there for tortoises, sea 
slugs, and other marine creatures . . . the Spratlys are clos-
est to Vietnam geographically and have been part of her ter-
ritory early in history. In 1834, under the reign of Emperor 
Minh Mang, the Spratlys appeared in the first Vietnamese 
map as an integral part of the national territory. 
In order to strengthen its position, on September 28, 1979, the Viet-
namese government released a White Book, ‘Vietnam’s Sovereignty 
Over Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagos,’ which listed nineteen 
items of evidence, including official records, maps, decrees, administra-
tive decisions, and statements made by the former French colonial gov-
ernment and the South Vietnamese government. Furthermore, it stated 
that Vietnam was the first country to survey, explore, occupy, and claim 
sovereignty over those islands.62
Vietnam currently occupies at least 29 maritime features in the 
Spratly Islands. 
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISPUTES 
On January 22, 2013, the Philippines initiated a Notification and 
Statement of Claim at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS), seeking to invalidate China’s nine-dash line.63 The Philippines 
argue that the Chinese claims within the nine-dash line are contrary to 
the provisions of the UNCLOS. Under such reasoning, what China occu-
 60.  The PRC was then a strong ally of the North Vietnam. See Haller-Trost, The Spratly 
Islands, supra note 42, pp. 50-51. 
61.  Fact Sheet, No. 2/74, South Vietnamese Embassy, Washington, D.C., 28 January 
1974. Cited from Park, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, supra note 7, p. 212. 
 62.  Pao-Min CHANG, “Sino-Vietnam Territorial Dispute,” Asia Pacific Community, Vol. 
28 (1985), pp. 74-87. 
 63.  Republic of the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, Notification and State-
ment of Claim, No. 13-0211 (January 22, 2013). Available at https://www.dfa.gov.ph/ in-
dex.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/unclos/216-sfa-statement-on-the-unclos-arbitral-proceedings-
against-china. 
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pies in the South China Sea are just mere rocks and Chinese structures on 
those submerged features are illegal. In addition, the Philippines argue 
that China’s maritime law enforcement actions would constitute an un-
lawful interference with Manila’s rights to exploit resources in its sector 
of the South China Sea. 
China rejects the Notification filed by the Philippines. Their reason 
is that a declaration made by China in 2006, pursuant to Article 298 of 
the Convention, excluded disputes regarding such matters as those relat-
ed to maritime delimitation from compulsory dispute settlement proce-
dures, including arbitration. Moreover, Chinese analysts believe Manila’s 
effort to push for the establishment of a tribunal of arbitration not only 
abuses the UNCLOS, but is also politically motivated.64
On August 27, 2013, the Tribunal of Arbitration issued its first Pro-
cedural Order, establishing an initial timetable for the arbitration and 
adopting the Rules of Procedure. In the first Procedural Order, the Tribu-
nal of Arbitration formally adopted the Rules of Procedure and fixed 
March 30, 2014 as the date on which the Philippines should submit its 
Memorial. The Tribunal of Arbitration directs the Philippines to fully 
address all issues, including matters relating to the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal of Arbitration, the admissibility of the Philippines’ claim, as 
well as the merits of the dispute.65 The Philippines filed a memorial on 
March 30, 2014 with the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The Arbitral 
Tribunal then issued its second Procedural Order on June 3, 2014 estab-
lishing the next steps in the timetable for the arbitration. In Procedural 
Order No. 2, the Arbitral Tribunal fixed December 15, 2014 as the date 
for China to submit its Counter-Memorial responding to the Philippines’ 
Memorial.66 China obviously refused because it argues that the arbitra-
tion matters raised by the Philippines are under the comprehension of the 
Declaration filed by mainland China in 2006 in accordance with Article 
298 of the UNCLOS, which excludes disputes concerning maritime de-
limitation from compulsory arbitration and other compulsory dispute set-
tlement procedures. 
 64.  “Beijing rejects Manila move,” China.org.cn, April 27, 2013, http://china.org.cn/ 
world/2013-04/27/content_28674405.htm. 
 65.  Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines 
and the People’s Republic of China: Arbitral Tribunal Establishes Rules of Procedure and Ini-
tial Timetable,” Permanent Court of Arbitration, August 27, 2013, http://www.pca-cpa. 
org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2311. 
 66.  Permanent Court of Arbitration, Press Release on Arbitration between the Republic of 
the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, June 3, 2014. http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2638. 
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After the first hearing on July 7, 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal issued 
its award on jurisdiction and admissibility on October 29, 2015. The 
Philippines made 15 Submissions requesting the Tribunal to find the fol-
lowing:67
1) China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, 
like those of the Philippines, may not extend beyond 
those permitted by the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS” or the “Convention”);
2) China’s claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and 
to “historic rights,” with respect to the maritime areas 
of the South China Sea encompassed by the so-called 
“nine-dash line” are contrary to the Convention and 
without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the 
geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime 
entitlements under UNCLOS; 
3) Scarborough Shoal generates no entitlement to an ex-
clusive economic zone or continental shelf; 
4) Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Subi Reef 
are low-tide elevations that do not generate entitlement 
to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or conti-
nental shelf, and are not features that are capable of 
appropriation by occupation or otherwise; 
5) Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of 
the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of 
the Philippines; 
6) Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes 
Reef) are low-tide elevations that do not generate enti-
tlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or 
continental shelf, but their low-water line may be used 
to determine the baseline from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea of Namyit and Sin Cowe, respective-
ly, is measured; 
7) Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef 
generate no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone 
or continental shelf; 
8) China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment 
and exercise of the sovereign rights of the Philippines 
with respect to the living and non-living resources of 
its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf; 
 67.  Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, http:// 
www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506. 
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9) China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and 
vessels from exploiting the living resources in the ex-
clusive economic zone of the Philippines; 
10) China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen 
from pursuing their livelihoods by interfering with tra-
ditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal; 
11) China has violated its obligations under the Conven-
tion to protect and preserve the marine environment at 
Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal; 
12) China’s occupation and construction activities on Mis-
chief Reef: 
(a) violate the provisions of the Convention concern-
ing artificial islands, installations and structures; 
(b) violate China’s duties to protect and preserve the 
marine environment under the Convention; and 
(c) constitute unlawful acts of attempted appropria-
tion in violation of the Convention; 
13) China has breached its obligations under the Conven-
tion by operating its law enforcement vessels in a dan-
gerous manner causing serious risk of collision to  
Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity of Scar-
borough Shoal; 
14) Since the commencement of this arbitration in January 
2013, China has unlawfully aggravated and extended 
the dispute by, among other things: 
(a) interfering with the Philippines’ rights of naviga-
tion in the waters at, and adjacent to, Second 
Thomas Shoal; 
(b) preventing the rotation and resupply of Philippine 
personnel stationed at Second Thomas Shoal; and 
(c) endangering the health and well-being of Philip-
pine personnel stationed at Second Thomas Shoal; 
and
15) China shall desist from further unlawful claims and ac-
tivities.
The Arbitral Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction to consider the 
Philippines’ Submissions No. 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 13. However, the 
Tribunal reserved consideration of its jurisdiction to rule on Submissions 
No. 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 12, and 14 to the merits phase. In addition, it also di-
rected the Philippines to clarify the content and narrow the scope of its 
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Submission 15, and reserved consideration of its jurisdiction over Sub-
mission No. 15 to the merits phase.68
The second hearing took place on November 24 through November 
30, 2015.69 In the second hearing, the Philippines raised a question to the 
Tribunal that Taiping Island is not an island in terms of the UNCLOS 
Article 121’s interpretation of the “sustain[able] human habitation.” The
Philippines argued that there is no water supply, topsoil, or natural vege-
tation.70 However, these are controversial issues, which will be discussed 
later.
Apart from the legal conflicts between China and the Philippines, 
countries from outside the region also make China uncomfortable in 
dealing with the issues of the South China Sea. The United States and its 
diplomatic policy on rebalancing is especially the case, although the 
United States reiterates that China is not the target of such a policy. 
Nonetheless, according to a recent interview with General Herbert 
“Hawk” Carlisle, chief of U.S. Air Force operations in the Pacific, by 
Foreign Policy, the idea behind the “rebalancing” is simple: ring China 
with U.S. and allied forces, just like the West did to the Soviet Union, 
back in the Cold War. In other words, the U.S. Air Force dispatching 
fighters and tankers to Darwin, Australia on a rotational basis, and send-
ing jets to Changi East air base in Singapore, Korat air base in Thailand, 
a site in India, and possibly to bases at Kubi Point and Puerto Princesa in 
the Philippines and airfields in Indonesia and Malaysia would be the re-
alization of its “rebalancing strategy” which would be a “containment” of 
China.71 Such a statement obviously would enhance China’s skepticism.
On April 28, 2014, the Philippines and the United States signed an 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement which will provide U.S. 
troops with greater access to military bases in the Philippines.72 This 
agreement would be a clear gesture to reassure the U.S. Asian allies in-
 68.  Ibid.
 69.  Permanent Court of Arbitration, Press Release No. 8: “The Tribunal Commences 
Hearing on Merits”, 24 November 2015, http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1521; and 
Press Release No. 9: “The Tribunal Concludes Hearing on the Merits”, 30 November 2015, 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1524.  
 70.  Permanent Court of Arbitration, Day 2 (25th November 2015), Hearing on the Merits 
and Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility. For transcript on Day 2, see 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1548, pp. 107-118. 
 71.  John Reed, “U.S. Deploying Jets around Asia to Keep China Surrounded,” Foreign 
Policy, 29 July 2013, http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/29/us_deploying_ jets 
_around_asia_to_keep_china_surrounded. 
 72.  Carl Thayer, “Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree-
ment,” The Diplomat, 2 May 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philipp- 
ines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/. 
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volved in territorial disputes on the South China Sea with China, and 
give the U.S. more flexibility to carry out its rebalancing strategy in the 
region. Nonetheless, there will be more criticism and skepticism from 
China, and opposition to more U.S. presence in the South China Sea re-
gion.
In the meantime, senior ASEAN (the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations) officials and the Chinese foreign minister met in Suzhou, 
China on September 15, 2013 to formally discuss the possibility of estab-
lishing a Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea. According to 
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the meeting ended positively 
with an agreement to seek “gradual progress and consensus through con-
sultations,”73 although no deadlines or details about the joint working 
group that will carry out the task were made available. From the results 
of the meeting, it seems China might have agreed in principle to a COC. 
Notwithstanding, it might be still be immature to presume China 
would accept a document with legal binding force, especially when Chi-
na has a different opinion as to the Philippines initiating the tribunal of 
arbitration. Furthermore, the conflict between Vietnam and China flared 
in May 2014 when China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
moved the drilling rig near Paracels, thus making the situation more in-
tricate and relations between China and Vietnam highly tense.74 More 
than that, riots in southern Vietnam lead to a serious loss for Taiwanese 
companies and businessmen. According to a preliminary estimate by the 
Council of Taiwanese Chambers of Commerce in Vietnam, the protesters 
set fire to at least 16 Taiwanese owned factories, and 500 Taiwanese-
owned plants were damaged. Such a development surprised international 
community especially when China and Vietnam showed amicable inter-
relations last year. 
Oil rig 981 is located 17 nautical miles from Chinese-occupied Tri-
ton Island (Zhongjian Dao in Chinese), which is the most southwestern 
island of the Pracels and about 120 nautical miles from Vietnamese 
coastline. Both parties claim sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, but 
China have successfully controlled these land features after it expelled 
the South Vietnamese forces in 1974 at the Battle of the Paracels. How-
ever, in terms of the legal basis, China believes the oil rig is located in its 
claimed Paracels waters as well as in its nine dashed line water area. 
China has expressed that the rig operation was interfered by a large num-
 73.  Press Conference, Chinese Foreign Ministry, 16 September 2013, http://www.fmprc. 
gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1077263.shtml. 
 74.  Hilary Whiteman, “China Uses Vietnamese Textbook to Back Claim in South China 
Sea Dispute,” CNN: International, Asia, 11 June 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/11/ 
world/asia/china-vietnam-paracels/.
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ber of Vietnamese vessels, which infringes on China’s sovereignty, its 
sovereign rights and its jurisdiction. On the other hand, Vietnam insists 
that oil rig 981 intruded into its 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic 
zone measured from its coastline. Vietnam claims that China’s action is 
against the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). For the nature of this recent standoff, it is an entanglement 
of sovereignty claiming and resource demanding, which make this stand-
off itself more complex and harder to reach a satisfied solution. 
Judging from the timing for China to deploy oil rig 981, it is criti-
cized that China destroys the friendly atmosphere with Vietnam. In re-
cent years, China and Vietnam have maintained a relatively good rela-
tionship. Especially when the Philippines filed its arbitration case, China 
seems to take amicable diplomacy towards Vietnam. During Chinese 
Premier LI Keqiang’s visit to Vietnam last October, both parties agreed 
to set up a working group to jointly explore their disputed waters in the 
South China Sea and both vowed to move beyond the territorial row and 
enhance bilateral ties. For this, many critics argue that China was making 
an over assertive movement which shows its brutality on claiming juris-
diction over South China Sea. However, the reality might not be so. 
However, according to the Chinese explanation, the CNOOC has 
been conducting seismic operations and well site surveys in the area for 
the past 10 years and the drilling operation has been a continuation of the 
process of explorations and falls well within China’s sovereignty and ju-
risdiction. Secondly, China might perceive the surrounding diplomatic 
situation as becoming more arduous in the coming years since it has mis-
givings about the U.S. rebalancing strategy. Moreover, China is an ener-
gy importing country and desperately hunger for hydrocarbon resources. 
It will try every possible ways to solve its demands for energy. 
Nonetheless, China might have erred in this standoff. Firstly, the 
deployment of oil rig 981 might push Vietnam into the coalition with the 
U.S. or at least, Vietnam will be more cautious when considering future 
China’s market access and foreign investment from China. Secondly, ac-
cording to coded document HN0034 titled “South China Sea Drilling 
Work by M/V ‘Hai Yang Shi You 981’” and publicized by Chinese Hai-
nan Maritime Safety Administration, “in the area with[in] 3 nautical 
miles radius of 15-29.58N 111-12.06E from 04 May to 15 August enter-
ing [is] prohibited.” This is an ordinary announcement for maritime safe-
ty, but the “3 nautical miles radius” is a sensitive distance when com-
pared with the “cannon rule” in measuring a traditional territorial sea. 
Thirdly, the standoff might encourage Vietnam to file an arbitration 
against China, just like the Philippines did last January, and this would 
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align Vietnam, the Philippines or even other claimants together. Obvi-
ously this will put China into another troublesome predicament. 
Another issue that was triggered by the Philippine-initiated arbitra-
tion mentioned above is the legal status of Taiping Island, which is under 
the jurisdiction of Taiwan. In the second hearing of the arbitration, the 
Philippines challenged the status of Taiping Island (Itu Aba), which is a 
part of the sovereign territory of Taiwan, by claiming that Taiping Island 
constitutes only a rock rather than an island. 
In 1946, the Republic of China (Taiwan) recovered the islands and 
geological features in the Nansha (Spratly) Islands from Japan, including 
the largest naturally formed island—Taiping Island. According to tran-
scripts from the two hearings, the Philippines attempted to characterize 
Taiping Island as a rock by indicating that it has an area of less than 0.43 
square kilometers, no permanent population, no potable water, and is ca-
pable of generating limited quantities of agricultural produce. 
Contrary to Philippine statements, however, Taiping Island possess-
es an adequate water supply. There are several groundwater wells on the 
island, some of which were in use long before Taiwan’s Coast Guard 
Administration took over management of Taiping Island in 2000 from 
the ROC Ministry of National Defense. In a more detailed description, 
personnel stationed on the Island have routinely relied on drinking water 
from the wells since the Taiping Island was restored to the ROC gov-
ernment’s jurisdiction in 1946. Apart from well water, there are water-
retaining facilities mainly used for farming.75
Taiping Island, which in fact has a land area of 0.50 square kilome-
ters, has consistently sustained more than 120 people, and is home to a 
functioning farm that produces a wide variety of fruits and vegetables in-
cluding corn, sweet potatoes, mangoes and guavas. Furthermore, it has a 
hospital to provide emergency medical treatment to the personnel sta-
tioned there as well as foreign fishermen operating in the area. 
It is evident that Taiping Island qualifies as an island in accordance 
with Article 121 of the UNCLOS. So why then does the Philippines ar-
gue that it is a rock? Distance is the answer. 
The distance between Taiping Island and the Philippine island of 
Palawan is about 199.6 nautical miles. As each is entitled to an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles, this would create a wide ar-
ea of overlap. Furthermore, if Taiping Island is deemed capable of gen-
75 ROC Ministry of the Interior, Press Release "ROC Minister of the Interior Chen Wei-zen 
presides over a ceremony marking the opening of a wharf and lighthouse on Taiping Island", 
12 Dec 2015. See http://maritimeinfo.moi.gov.tw/marineweb/LayFrom0.aspx?icase=T03&pid 
=0000001989.
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erating a 200 nautical mile EEZ and a continental shelf, a delimitation of 
maritime boundaries would need to be conducted for the entire overlap-
ping area, which is not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 
Obviously, the claim that Taiping Island is a rock is fallacious. The 
Philippines raises the issue so it can contend that the EEZ around Pala-
wan does not overlap with any maritime zone that could be generated by 
other maritime features. Under this claim, the Philippines argues that 
Taiping Island’s maritime area should be confined to 12 nautical miles. 
By citing judgments from ICJ Territorial and Maritime Dispute, (Nicara-
gua v. Colombia, 2012),76 as well as ITLOS St. Martin’s Island (a dis-
pute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Bangla-
desh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh/Myanmar, 2012),77
the Philippines jumps to the conclusion on the definition of the maritime 
area for Taiping Island. The Philippines deliberately ignores the fact that 
these cases are concerning maritime delimitation. 
The Philippines’ argument regarding Taiping Island is simply a le-
gal tactic that does not contribute to the practical resolution of disputes in 
the South China Sea. In addition, its position might further escalate ten-
sions. This paper argues that there is risk from different perspectives, es-
pecially when the issue touches upon national intestates, and that the best 
way of managing the risk might be containing it under a manageable 
mechanism. With this conception, organizing a living resources man-
agement mechanism would be a good start for the peace and stability of 
the South China Sea. 
IV.  LIVING RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN                           
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
A. Economic Development and Environmental Pollution 
The issues of environmental pollution in the South China Sea are 
generally due to population growth and urbanization in coastal cities, 
economic growth and increased material consumption, and highly pollut-
ing technologies for energy production and primary resource extraction. 
In addition, there has been an increase in oil spills and waste dumping by 
 76.  International Court of Justice, Judgement of Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nica-
ragua v. Colombia), 19 November 2012, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/124/17164.pdf. 
 77.  International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Judgement of Dispute concerning De-
limitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal 
(Bangladesh/ Myanmar), 14 March 2012, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents 
/cases/case_no_16/C16_Judgment_14_03_2012_rev.pdf. 
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transit vessels as a result of increasing trade and transport of raw materi-
als, fossil fuels, and commodities across the region’s shipping lanes.78
The South China Sea has been undergoing serious environmental 
degradations caused by land-based pollution, sea-based pollution, habitat 
loss, etc.79 In terms of land-based pollution, the South China Sea is sur-
rounded by quite a few large and rapidly growing cities, e.g. Guangzhou, 
Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Bangkok, Manila, Jakarta, and Singa-
pore. Wastewater from those cities has been flowing into the sea without 
being appropriately treated due to insufficient sewage treatment facili-
ties. Additionally, pesticides are used epidemically so that they become 
one of the major contributors to environmental degradation in the South 
China Sea region.80
As for sea-based pollution, the major causes of oil pollution are 
ships, oil and gas exploration, and production platforms. However, under 
the situation of the rapid growth of Asian economies, such as Taiwan, 
Japan, Korea, or China, growth of oil demand will bring on the growth of 
oil transportation via the sea,81 which will definitely increase the risk of 
oil spills. The UNEP has recognized the risk of oil spills in the region 
and has raised this issue, in particular in 2006 at the second East Asian 
Seas Congress held in Haikou, Hainan, China.82
For the aforementioned situation in the region, as the countries 
around the South China Sea expand their economies and consume more 
fossil fuel resources, they also produce more pollution and damage the 
marine environment. According to research over the last 70 years, the ar-
ea of mangroves bordering the South China Sea has been reduced by 
nearly 70 percent. At this reducing rate, all mangroves will be lost by the 
year 2030. The main losses result from conversion of land to other uses, 
e.g., shrimp farms, urban development and massive logging.83 Many of 
these countries are now making important decisions about technology 
and infrastructure with critical implications for long-term environmental 
 78.  David Rosenberg, “Environmental Pollution around the South China Sea: Developing 
a Regional Response”, Contemporary Southeast Asia (1 April 1999). See http://www.high- 
beam.com/doc/1G1-54455033.html. 
 79.  Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou, Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional 
Implications and International Cooperation, London: Ashgate Publishing, 2009, p. 232. 
 80.  Ibid.
 81.  For example, China is the world’s second-largest consumer of oil behind the United 
States, and the second-largest net importer of oil as of 2009. And, Korea is the second-largest 
importer of liquefied natural gas in the world behind Japan. See US Energy Information Ad-
ministration, http://www.eia.gov/countries/. 
 82.  Supra note 67. 
 83.  Brian Morton and Graham Blackmore, “South China Sea”, Marine Pollution Bulletin,
Vol. 42, No. 12 (2001), p. 1246. 
37530-aop_15-3 Sheet No. 13 Side B      03/03/2016   14:10:38
37530-aop_15-3 Sheet No. 13 Side B      03/03/2016   14:10:38
AOP 2015.3 (Do Not Delete) 2/29/2016  3:17 PM 
26 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
change. Many of them face competitive market pressures to produce at 
the lowest, short-term cost possible. As long as governments compete 
with each other for investment in an increasingly integrated world econ-
omy, they are reluctant to impose costly regulations to maintain envi-
ronmental standards which might discourage investment and output. 
From the individual national, short-term view, pollution control pro-
grams may hinder economic performance and increase consumer prices. 
Nations that do impose charges on polluters are thought to give business 
enterprises an incentive to relocate in countries with more lenient stand-
ards. As a result, many environmental pollution problems are often over-
shadowed by concerns over economic growth.84
B. Overfishing as an International Issue 
The development of globalization has already become an important 
phenomenon in the modern international society. Such a phenomenon 
has been demonstrated by the economic elements of production flowing 
with an unprecedented speed and scale in the global scope. Although the 
process of globalization has been witnessed for several decades, it is still 
under a drastic debate whether globalization would cause the collapse of 
national boundaries. Furthermore, will states collapse in the future due to 
their functions being restricted? 
Most discussions or debates on “globalization” are on international
financial transaction, technology flows, transnational cooperations, capi-
tal flows, cross-border movements of people, and so forth. In other 
words, states, as members of the international community, are getting 
closer and sharing common interests. Therefore, more functional fields, 
and even disputes, are emerging. 
It is a trend that national sovereignty has been challenged by the de-
velopments mentioned above. Not only do such phenomena appear in 
daily economic life, but they also appear in the development of an inter-
national legal system, especially in the fields of high seas fisheries and 
international environmental protection. 
For the purposes of statistics concerning the fish catches, a list of 
major fishing areas is maintained by the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of the United Nations (FAO).85 The South China Sea region is with-
in Area 71, which is under the title of Western Central Pacific. In terms 
of global fishery production, it reached 82.6 million tonnes in 2011, and 
79.7 million tonnes in 2012. Of the FAO statistical areas, the Northwest 
 84.  Supra note 89. 
 85.  FAO, Map of FAO Major Fishing Areas for Statistical Purposes, http://www.fao.org/ 
3/a-az126e.pdf. . 
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Pacific had the highest production with 21.4 million tonnes (26 percent 
of the global marine catch) in 2011, followed by the Southeast Pacific 
with 12.3 million tonnes (15 percent), the Western Central Pacific with 
11.5 million tonnes (14 percent), and the Northeast Atlantic with 8.0 mil-
lion tonnes (9 percent).86
Total production in the Western Central Pacific grew continuously 
to a maximum of 11.7 million tonnes in 2010, and was 11.5 million 
tonnes in 2011. This area contributes about 14 percent of global marine 
production. However, there are reasons for concern as regards to the state 
of the resources, with most stocks being either fully fished or overfished, 
particularly in the western part of the South China Sea. The high reported 
catches have probably been maintained through the expansion of the 
fisheries to new areas and possible double counting in the transshipment 
of catches between fishing areas, which leads to bias in estimates of pro-
duction, potentially masking negative trends in stock status.87
The resources of the South China Sea, living and non-living, are 
rapidly being exploited by the people of the region, who are heavily con-
centrated along the coastline.88 Overfishing or a declining average annual 
fish catch now threatens the extensive fishing industry. Many fishermen 
are forced to apply more efficient and aggressive fishing techniques, and 
to venture further out to new fishing grounds. For the most extreme cas-
es, some even apply illegal methods such as blast fishing and cyanide 
poisoning. Fish and coral habitats are also degraded by increased sedi-
mentation, especially from land development. Coral reefs have been rav-
aged to provide for building materials, and plundered for ornamental 
commodities. 89 Furthermore, Chinese land reclamation projects on cer-
tain reefs in the Spratlys, such as Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mis-
 86.  FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture: Opportunities and Challenges,
Rome: FAO, 2014, p. 37. 
 87.  Ibid., p. 40. 
 88.  In terms of the South China Sea Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) which is bordered 
by China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. It covers an area of 3.2 mil-
lion square kilometers, of which 0.31% is protected, and contains 7.04% and 0.93% of the 
world’s coral reefs and sea mounts, respectively. S. Heileman, “South China Sea: LME #36”,
in Sherman, K. and Hempel, G. (Editors), The UNEP Large Marine Ecosystem Report: A Per-
spective on Changing Conditions in LMEs of the World’s Regional Seas. UNEP Regional 
Seas, Report and Studies No. 182 (2008). United Nations Environment Programme. Nairobi, 
Kenya. 
 89.  http://www.southchinasea.org/why.html. Also Global International Waters Assess-
ment (GIWA), Preliminary Results for the Scoping and Assessment of the South China Sea 
and Sulu-Celebes Seas. Draft discussion paper in the Regional GIWA Workshop, November 
5-8, 2001, Bangkok, Thailand (2001), quoted from Porfirio M. Alino, “The South China Sea-
Revisiting: The Large Marine Ecosystem Approach”. See http://innri.unuftp.is/pdf/South 
%20China%20Sea.pdf. 
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chief Reef, have also raised concerns on marine environmental protection 
matters.
A further concern mentioned by Nina Hachigian, US Ambassador 
to ASEAN, is that illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing ac-
tivities might cause serious damage on the fishery resources in the South 
China Sea. Common methods such as dynamite fishing, cyanide poison-
ing, and bottom trawling have wreaked havoc in regional ecosystems and 
threaten the future of the regional fishing market. Forty percent of the 
South China Sea’s fish stocks have already disappeared and 70 percent 
of the South China Sea’s coral reefs are rated to be in fair or poor condi-
tion.
Ms. Hachigian has listed some endangered species in the South 
China Sea which need an appropriate management mechanism to sur-
vive. For example, Green sea turtles and Hawksbill turtles are critically 
endangered. However, poaching turtles for their meat and shells remains 
common in the region. Millions of sharks are slaughtered every year 
solely for their fins. She has also mentioned that the increasing carbon in 
the atmosphere will take a slow, steady destructive toll on the oceans. 
Moreover, rising ocean temperatures threatens to reduce the availability 
of fish in traditional fishing areas as fish populations seek cooler waters. 
Therefore, overfishing and IUU fishing are compounded by the 
sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Fishing boats are travelling 
farther from their territorial waters because there are fewer fish to be 
found in traditional fishing grounds. Part of the reason the claimants are 
asserting sovereignty over islands, rocks, shoals and reefs is precisely 
because of the fish in the surrounding waters. Ambiguous claims, unilat-
eral fishing restrictions, and unclear law enforcement jurisdictions 
among the claimants would surely worsen this problem.90
V.  SOLUTION: COOPERATION AS AN OBLIGATION 
It is not the purpose of this paper to define the term “global govern-
ance” as there are a variety of definitions on this subject. Instead, the au-
thor would like to use the concept of cooperation to describe the on-
going processes of managing and conserving fishery resources. Such 
processes includes: international instruments, international organizations, 
and behavior of the states. 
 90.  Nina Hachigian, “The Other Problem in the South China Sea: Territorial disputes are 
not the only issue to trouble this vital maritime region”, The Diplomat (8 April 2015), 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/the-other-problem-in-the-south-china-sea/.  
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A. International Instruments Framework 
Basically, the 1982 UNCLOS91 and the 1995 Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks92 (hereinafter cited as “UNFSA”) provide certain possibilities on 
the regulation of cooperation among states in dealing with the issues of 
high seas fisheries. 
One of the basic issues to be considered is the nature of the duty to 
co-operate. It is noteworthy that the duty to co-operate among the states, 
whether they are amicable or antagonistic, can be traced back to certain 
documents made more than three decades ago. In a declaration adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1970,93 it states that 
“States have the duty to co-operate with one another, irrespective of the 
differences in their political, economic and social systems, in the various 
spheres of international relations. . .”
This duty can be characterized into one of the two forms: a duty to 
enter into negotiations; and a duty to negotiate and to reach an agree-
ment. Obviously both duties of cooperation require that negotiations be 
entered into in good faith. Moreover, the parties concerned shall be 
obliged to work together in good faith to attempt to reach an agreement, 
and to carry that agreement through to a successful conclusion.94 Under 
such considerations, certain provisions regulated in the UNCLOS and the 
UNFSA embrace the spirit of cooperation. 
According to Article 118 of the UNCLOS, states fishing on the 
same living marine resources or in the same area of the high seas shall 
 91.  The UNCLOS entered into force on 16 November 1994 and there are 167 states rati-
fied this Convention as at 2 January 2015. See “Chronological lists of ratifications of, acces-
sions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements”, http://www.un.org/ 
depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea .  
 92.  The UNFAS entered into force on 11 December 2001 and there are 82 states ratified 
this Agreement. UN, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Status of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement relating to the implementation of 
Part XI of the Convention, and of the Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of 
the Convention relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks. See http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf. 
 93.  1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 
2625(XXV), 24 October 1970. 
 94.  L. Guruswamy, “The Promise of the United Natins Convention on the Law of the 
Sea: Justice and Environmental Disputes”, Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol. 25 (1998), p. 189. 
Cited from Stuart M. Kaye, International Fisheries Management, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2001, p. 111. 
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cooperate in the conservation of these resources. With respect to strad-
dling fish stocks and highly migratory species on the high seas, the obli-
gation is supplemented with the special obligations of the relevant 
coastal states and states fishing for these stocks in adjacent areas of the 
high seas to co-operate for the conservation of these stocks.95 Taking into 
consideration of the practices in recent years from states and internation-
al organizations, these obligations have become part of international cus-
tomary law.96
Part 3 of the UNFSA includes several provisions for mechanisms 
for cooperation on the conservation of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory species. Although the introductory paragraph of Article 8 
seems to leave states a choice whether to co-operate directly or through 
regional or sub-regional fisheries management organizations or arrange-
ments, the ensuing paragraphs emplace radical limitations on this free-
dom. Where there exists a fisheries management organization or ar-
rangement competent enough to regulate the fishery for a specific strad-
straddling fish stock or highly migratory fish stocks, those states fishing 
for the stocks on the high seas and the relevant coastal states shall be-
come members of the organization or participants of the arrangement.97
States fishing for the stock on the high seas may choose not to join 
or participate, but are then obligated to apply the management measures 
adopted by the organization or arrangement, in order to be entitled to fish 
on the stock.98 If the straddling fish stock or highly migratory fish stocks 
is not subjected to the regulatory competence of any organization or ar-
rangement, states fishing for the stock on the high seas and the relevant 
coastal states are obligated to establish either an organization or other 
appropriate arrangements.99
B. Regional Fisheries Management Organization as a Mechanism 
In the absence of an effective centralized authority in dealing with 
the matters of fishing issues, then probably the regional fisheries organi-
zation is an alternative to secure sustainable conservation and manage-
ment of transboundary marine resources. Such regional fisheries cooper-
ation involves efforts by states to overcome collective action problems 
 95.  UNCLOS, Articles 63(2) and 64(1). 
 96.  Also see Tore Henriksen, Geir Honneland, and Are Sydnes, Law and Politics in 
Ocean Governance: The UN Fish Stocks Agreement and Regional Fisheries Management Re-
gimes, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, p. 15. 
 97.  UNFSA, Article 8(3). 
 98.  UNFSA, Article 8(4). 
 99.  UNFSA, Article 8(5). 
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related to the use of shared and common fisheries. This cooperation aris-
es when two or more concerned states identify a shared problem or goal 
which requires a common and co-operative solution. Such cooperation is 
often formalized through bilateral or multilateral agreements establishing 
principles, rules, procedures and institutional organizations for the im-
plementation of cooperation between the parties. In many cases these 
agreements are institutionalized by the formation of Regional Fishery 
Management Organizations (hereinafter cited as RFMOs).100
Most of the RFMOs operating in developing regions during the 
1950s and 1960s were established at the initiative of the Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). They were constituted 
with broad mandates to promote research, development and manage-
ment, but without regulatory powers. Moreover, these organizations were 
established as development mechanisms, so their operations were de-
pendent on funding from FAO and other donors. Thus, for their functions 
to be fulfilled, they heavily relied on the political will of members of the 
RFMOs to enforce regulations.101
Some scholars mention that the cooperative governance of marine 
resources management is meant to provide adequate means for meeting 
three major tasks: generation of adequate and reasonably consensual sci-
entific knowledge to permit informed judgments about whether and how 
exploitation of resources shall be conducted; adoption of legitimate and 
appropriate regulatory measures to govern economic activities while tak-
ing heed of existing knowledge; and development of a system to promote 
compliance with such measures among those engaged in resource use in 
the area.102 Therefore, the latter two tasks, i.e. regulatory measures and 
compliance of the members, will heavily rely upon members’ positive 
practices. 
Even so, some of the RFMOs have taken steps to improve their per-
formance in managing and conserving marine living resources. The au-
thor shall use the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (hereinafter 
cited as IATTC) to examine the progress. IATTC was established in 
 100.  Are K. Sydnes, “Regional Fishery Organizations: How and Why Organizational Di-
versity Matters,” Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 32 (2001), pp. 350-351. 
Also, Are K. Sydnes, “Regional Fisheries Organizations and International Fisheries Govern-
ance”, in Syma Ebbin, Alf Hoel, and Are K. Sydnes, eds., A Sea Change: The Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone and Governance Institutions for Living Marine Resources, The Netherlands: 
Springer, 2005, pp. 117-133. 
 101.  Are. K. Sydnes, “Regional Fishery Organizaitons in Developing Regions: Adapting to 
Changes in International Fisheries Law,” Marine Policy, Vol. 26 (2002), p. 374. 
 102.  Olav Schram Stokke, “Governance of High Seas Fisheries: The Role of Regime 
Linkages,” in Davor Vidas and Willy Ostreng, eds., Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the 
Century, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 159; 162-170. 
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1950 in accordance with the 1949 Convention for the Establishment of 
an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission.103 After almost fifty years 
of functioning, it was decided that the IATTC (Commission) and the 
1949 IATTC (Convention) should be strengthened and modernized to 
take into account recently adopted international instruments, such as the 
1982 UNCLOS, the 1992 Agenda 21 and Rio Declaration, the 1993 FAO 
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, the 1995 
FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and the 1995 
UNFSA.104 An ad hoc Working Group was formed to review the 1949 
Convention.105
The revising work was done in June 2003 with the adoption of an 
amended convention.106 According to Article 10 of the Antigua Conven-
tion, a Committee for the Review of Implementation of Measures Adopt-
ed by the Commission will be established: (a) to review and monitor 
compliance with conservation and management measures adopted by the 
Commission, as well as other cooperative measures; (b) to analyze in-
formation and any other information necessary to carry out its functions; 
(c) to provide the Commission with information, technical advice and 
recommendations relating to the implementation of, and compliance 
with, conservation and management measures; (d) to recommend to the 
Commission means of promoting compatibility; (e) recommend to the 
Commission means to promote the effective implementation of the Anti-
gua Convention; (f) to recommend to the Commission, in consultation 
with the Scientific Advisory Committee, the priorities and objectives of 
the program for data collection and monitoring of this Convention and 
assess and evaluate the results of that program; and (g) to perform other 
functions.107
Furthermore, Article 18 provides that Parties shall take the 
measures necessary to ensure the implementation of and compliance with 
the Antigua Convention and any conservation and management measures 
adopted pursuant thereto, including the adoption of the necessary laws 
 103.  For 1949 IATTC Convention, see http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles/IATTC_conven- 
tion_1949.pdf.  
 104.  IATTC, Resolution on the Establishment of a Working Group to Review the IATTC 
Convention, June 1998.  
 105.  Ibid.
 106.  Convention for the Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
Established by the 1949 Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Costa Rica (also known as “Antigua Convention”). For full text, see http://www.iattc.org/
PDFFiles2/Antigua_Convention_Jun_2003.pdf. 
 107.  Annex 3. Committee for the Review of Implementation of Measures Adopted by the 
Commission, Antigua Convention. 
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and regulations. Also, Parties shall provide to the Commission all the in-
formation that may be required for the fulfillment of the objective of the 
Antigua Convention, including statistical and biological information and 
information concerning its fishing activities in the Convention Area, and 
information regarding actions taken to implement the measures adopted 
in accordance with the Antigua Convention. 
Except for the actions made by the IATTC, other RFMOs took 
similar actions either by adopting resolutions or taking related measures 
so that the conservation and management measures could be achieved.108
From the aforementioned discussion, it might be safe to conclude 
that the RFMOs and arrangements have been given exclusive control to 
regulate the high seas fisheries of straddling fish stocks and highly mi-
gratory fish stocks.109
C. Regional Cooperation in the Semi-Enclosed Sea: A Case on 
South China Sea110
In terms of the geographical location, the South China Sea could be 
categorized as a “semi-enclosed sea,” which is provided in Article 122 of 
the UNCLOS defining the term: 
“[E]nclosed or semi-enclosed sea” means a gulf, basin or 
sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to   
another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting 
entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive 
economic zones of two or more coastal States. 
Because the South China Sea is semi-enclosed, any change in the 
ecosystem of the semi-enclosed sea will have significant impact on the 
 108.  For example, on 27 December 2000, the International Commission for the Conserva-
tion of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) adopted a resolution under the title of “Supplemental Resolu-
tion by ICCAT to Enhance the Effectiveness of the ICCAT Measures to Eliminate Illegal, Un-
regulated and Unreported Fishing Activities by Large-Scale Tuna Longline Vessels in the 
Convention Area and Other Areas”. Under this resolution, the ICCAT Commission urged Ja-
pan and Taiwan to take the necessary measures to complete the scrapping of IUU vessels built 
in Japan and Taiwan. 
 109.  Tore Henriksen, Geir Honneland, and Are Sydnes, Law and Politics in Ocean Gov-
ernance: The UN Fish Stocks Agreement and Regional Fisheries Management Regimes, The 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, p. 16; Robin Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The 
Law of the Sea, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 309; F. O. Vicuna, “The 
International Law to High Seas Fisheries: From Unrestricted Freedom of Fishing to Sustaina-
ble Use,” in O. S. Stokke, ed, Governing High Seas Fisheries, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001, pp. 40-42. 
 110.  Unless specifically mentioned, this sub-section is basically quoted from Kuan-Hsiung 
WANG, “Bridge over Troubled Waters: Fisheries Cooperation as a Resolution to the South 
China Sea Conflicts,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2001), pp. 541-543.  
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whole area. It is generally recognised that the living resources in the 
South China Sea area migrate from one EEZ to another or even to other 
marine areas, particularly those highly migratory species such as tuna 
and other shared stocks. Each country may already have its own assess-
ment of its living resources in its EEZ, assuming that the definition and 
delineation of each EEZ is clear. The problem is that many of those EEZ 
boundaries are not well defined or mutually agreed upon by the relevant 
parties. Likewise, there are various conflicting claims to islands that 
complicate and defer the determination of the EEZ boundaries. For this 
reason, many experts and scholars are convinced of the need to cooperate 
on the assessment of the living resources in the South China Sea area 
without regard to jurisdictional boundaries. The basis for this endeavour 
would be Article 123 of the UNCLOS regarding enclosed and semi-
enclosed seas.111 The UNCLOS has foreseen this problem, since Article 
123 provides that, 
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should 
co-operate with each other in the exercise of their rights and 
in the performance of their duties under this Convention. To 
this end they shall endeavour, directly or through an appro-
priate regional organisation: 
(a) to co-ordinate the management, conservation, explora-
tion and exploitation of the living resources of the sea; 
(b) to co-ordinate the implementation of their rights and 
duties with respect to the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment; 
(c) to co-ordinate their scientific research policies and   
undertake where appropriate joint programmes of sci-
entific research in the area; 
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested states or inter-
national organisations to co-operate with them in fur-
therance of the provisions of this article. 
Therefore, all parties concerned should be aware that fish are migra-
tory and fishery resources are exhaustible, so rational use of the South 
China Sea and the preservation of its marine environment should be im-
portant to all parties. Thus, cooperation among littoral states in the region 
is essential. In order to avoid overfishing or depletion of resources, con-
 111.  Hasjim Djalal, “Issue Paper for Technical Working Group on the Resources Assess-
ment of the South China Sea Informal Workshop,” in the Second Working Group Meeting on 
Resources Assessment and Ways of Development in the South China Sea, Jakarta, Indonesia, 
5-6 July 1993, pp. 1-2. 
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servation measures have to be taken. Such measures are not possible 
without regional cooperation and close co-ordination among the parties 
concerned, especially in a semi-enclosed sea. 
Indeed, a semi-enclosed sea concept could conceivably provide the 
catalyst to promote cooperation and co-ordination of the management of 
resources in the South China Sea.112 Under such circumstances, for all 
the littoral states to make the boundary delimitation issue the first priori-
ty seems unwise. Rather, concentrating upon their common interests can 
be an essential motivation to resolve conflicts rationally. 
Fishery cooperation could be the most feasible course of action for 
the littoral states since through cooperation, fishery resources could be 
properly conserved and managed such that economic waste and over-
exploitation may be avoided. 
Cooperation in the utilization of fishery resources is a feasible and 
practical way to start a regional cooperation regime. It sidesteps the issue 
of sovereignty and focuses upon a common interest, namely the utiliza-
tion of living resources. It also defers long-term negotiations with respect 
to delimitation of the continental shelf relating to the hydrocarbon re-
source issue. Thus, as co-operative relationships are forged with regard 
to fishery resources, mutual confidence will build among the various par-
ties that may eventually contribute to successful cooperation with respect 
to hydrocarbon resources. Fishery resources management is crucial to 
preventing over-exploitation or overfishing, and may be a touchstone of 
the littoral states’ sincerity.
Without affecting jurisdictional boundaries as laid down in the 
UNCLOS, it is certainly possible to have regional joint fishery manage-
ment in the South China Sea as the starting point for further cooperation. 
If all states in this region treat cooperation as a key step toward achieving 
mutual benefit, then the future for such a regional cooperation mecha-
nism is assured. 
 112.  Lee G. Cordner, “The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea,” Ocean Devel-
opment and International Law, Vol. 25(1994), p. 71. 
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VI. TAIWAN’S ROLE IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
A. 2013 Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement 
As discussed earlier, Taiwan is one of the claimants to the islands 
sovereignty as well as maritime areas of the South China Sea. Although 
there are problems with its international recognition, Taiwan could play a 
constructive role in such a chaotic and urgent time. 
In taking consideration of fostering regional peace and stability, 
economic prosperity and the sustainable development of the marine envi-
ronment, as well as seeking to find a path to coexistence and mutual 
prosperity, President MA Ying-jeou declared the East China Sea Peace 
Initiative in August 2012 and called on all parties concerned to:113
1. Refrain from taking any antagonistic actions; 
2. Shelve controversies and not abandon dialogue; 
3. Observe international law and resolve disputes through peace-
ful means; 
4. Seek consensus on a code of conduct in the East China Sea; 
and
5. Establish a mechanism for cooperation on exploring and de-
veloping resources in the East China Sea. 
The main points of the Initiative are “shelving disputes, and work-
ing on joint development.” These ideas also conform to the “provisional 
arrangement” which is provided in the UNCLOS Article 74(3) on EEZ 
delimitation and 83(3) on continental shelf delimitation.114 The text 
reads: 
Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States 
concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall 
make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a 
practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to 
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such 
arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimita-
tion.
For the best result in resolving delimitation disputes, states in dis-
pute should take the following actions: 
 113.  The Republic of China (Taiwan), “East China Sea Peace Initiative,” Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, ROC, (August 5, 2012), http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/Topics/TopicsIndex/ 
?opno=cc7f748f-f55f-4eeb-91b4-cf4a28bbb86f. 
 114.  UNCLOS, Articles 74(3) and 83(3). 
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A. Initiate negotiations in good faith.  Under Articles 74(3) and 
83(3), the states concerned, in a spirit of understanding and 
cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provision-
al arrangements of a practical nature. The phrase, ‘in a spirit 
of understanding and cooperation,’ indicates that the parties 
concerned should negotiate in a spirit of good faith (or bona 
fide). The obligation to seek agreement in good faith has 
been defined in many well-established precedents of inter-
national law. 
B. Self-restraint. Even if the parties fail to reach a final agree-
ment, they still have to restrain themselves from taking any 
action that would cause the dispute to deteriorate. That is to 
say, mutual restraint should be exercised pending final 
agreement or settlement in order not to impede the comple-
tion of the final delimitation. Only under such a presump-
tion can the arrangement correspond to the spirit of the pro-
vision, ‘not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final 
agreement.’
In addition, two aspects of the provisional arrangements should not 
be overlooked: 
A. Transitional nature: In the interests of international peace, 
the states concerned shall enter into provisional arrange-
ments so as not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the 
final delimitation. 
B. Practical nature: Because the provisional arrangement is    
of a practical nature, it focuses on practical issues, i.e.          
utilization of resources, and puts the maritime bounda-
ry/jurisdiction delimitation and sovereignty issues aside. 
The East China Sea Peace Initiative would be meaningful in the 
present tense situation because, on the one hand, “promoting joint devel-
opment” might be a better way to ease the disputes, while on the other 
hand, it is also important to observe the role that Taiwan could and might 
play, since Taiwan is in a leverage position. The practice of the Taiwan-
Japan Fisheries Agreement of April 10, 2013 would be a good example 
of the East China Sea Peace Initiative.
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Map 2: Designated Zone assigned in the 2013 Taiwan-Japan        
Fisheries Agreement115
The background for finalizing the Agreement is mixed with political 
as well as legal considerations. On the one hand, Japan wants to protect 
its strategic interests in the East China Sea; it was trying to prevent   
Taiwan from cooperating with China while the conflict between Japan 
and China remained intense. On the other, the influence from the United 
States is also explicit. Both Japan and Taiwan are important to the United 
States in guarding its “rebalancing strategy.” The fisheries issue is minor 
compared to other security or strategic issues, so the United States is pos-
itive towards the conclusion of the Agreement. Furthermore, the Taiwan-
Japan Fisheries Agreement also means a significant development of rela-
tions for both Japan and Taiwan. 
Without considering political concerns, there are some legal points 
which are also noteworthy if the Agreement is to be reviewed thorough-
ly.
1. A wider “Agreement Application Zone” is designated for fish-
ermen from both sides who may conduct fishing operations 
 115.  Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS (AMTI), The Evolution of Asia’s Con-
tested Waters, available at http://amti.csis.org/maritime-disputes 
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without being disturbed by the other side. In other words, this 
Zone is a joint fishery zone which could accommodate fishery 
activities from both Taiwan and Japan. 
2. Due to heavy fishery activities by Taiwanese and Japanese 
fishermen and for the purposes of regulating the operation of 
fisheries, a “Special Cooperation Zone,” located in the south-
east corner of the aforementioned “Agreement Application 
Zone,” has been designated and is a matter for further discus-
sion by the Taiwan-Japan Fishery Committee. This Committee 
was set up on May 7, 2013. 
3. There is no accord in the Agreement regarding the area of the 
12 nautical miles surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands. This is a 
result of shelving the sovereignty disputes and will be subject 
to future discussion. However, this might be the most contro-
versial point, most likely causing a lot of discussion and dis-
content.
The Agreement is a good start for sustaining peace in the East Chi-
na Sea. It focuses on the fisheries issue and puts aside the sovereignty or 
delimitation issues, which is a praiseworthy move made by both Taiwan 
and Japan. It is also putting into practice the “provisional arrangement” 
stipulated in the UNCLOS. Nonetheless, there are still a lot of matters to 
discuss and to be developed between the parties concerned. The Agree-
ment relies upon the functioning of the Taiwan-Japan Fishery Committee 
and good practice from both sides. 
B. The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)  
and Taiwan’s Participation 
Apart from the fact that Taiwan can, and would be willing to, enter 
into a bilateral fisheries agreement with another party, Taiwan is also  
capable of participating in a regional fisheries management organization. 
The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) is one of the 
precedents. 
IATTC was established in accordance with the 1949 Convention for 
the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission be-
tween the United States and Costa Rica. The 1949 IATTC Convention 
entered into force on March 3, 1950 with the Inter-American Tropical 
Tuna Commission (IATTC) being established. It is now the oldest of the 
regional fishery management organizations (RFMOs). 
In 1998 it was decided that the IATTC and the 1949 IATTC Con-
vention should be modernized to take into account recently adopted in-
ternational instruments, such as the 1995 United Nations Straddling and 
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Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) and the 1982 
UNCLOS. As a result of fishing performance in the east Pacific Ocean 
and for the purposes of enhancing conservation and management of tuna 
resources, Taiwan expressed its willingness to work with other IATTC 
members. 
Through a 1998 resolution, the IATTC Commission welcomed 
Taiwan’s commitment to participate actively in the work of the IATTC 
and recommended that the member governments of the Commission 
should find an appropriate mechanism to enable the active participation 
of Taiwan in the work of the IATTC. Later, Taiwan was invited to attend 
the meetings of the Working Group to Review the 1949 IATTC Conven-
tion as an equal negotiating partner along with the other IATTC Conven-
tion Parties. 
On November 14, 2003, the Taiwanese delegate signed an Instru-
ment for the Participation of Fishing Entities in Washington, D.C. along 
with other signatories. As a fishing entity, Taiwan is able to enjoy all the 
rights and have all the responsibilities stipulated in the amended 1949 
IATTC Convention (also named the Antigua Convention) on an equal 
footing with other members of the Commission after the entry of the  
Antigua Convention. Because Taiwan’s participation issue was solved, 
Taiwan will be able to participate in the IATTC in the capacity of a fish-
ing entity and with an organizational status as a Member of the Commis-
sion under the designation of Chinese Taipei. Including Taiwan as a 
member is an ideal arrangement because it is one of the leading distant 
water fishing nations in the world. Thus, there is a necessity to incorpo-
rate Taiwan into the mechanism in order to more effectively accomplish 
conservation and management of marine living resources. Taiwan could 
contribute its knowledge and technology to the conservation and man-
agement mechanism.116
 116.  For detailed development of the IATTC, its Convention amendments, and Taiwan’s
participation, see Dustin Kuan-Hsiung WANG, “Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations and the Conceptual Revolution on Fishing Entity: The Case of the 
IATTC,” Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 37 (2006) pp. 209–219. 
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VII.   CONCLUSION 
Fishing or fishery is a vital aspect of the world’s diet, economy, and 
biodiversity. In recent years, fishing industry is recognized as one of the 
important elements which would have influence on the food security.117
World population is expected to grow from the present 6.8 billion people 
to about 9 billion by 2050, and the Southeast Asia is one of the most 
populated regions. The growing need for nutritious and healthy food will 
increase the demand for fishery products from marine sources, whose 
productivity is already highly stressed by excessive fishing pressure, 
growing organic pollution, toxic contamination, coastal degradation and 
climate change. Looking towards 2050, the question that remains is how 
will fishery governance (and the national and international policy and  
legal frameworks within which it is nested) ensure a sustainable harvest, 
maintain biodiversity and ecosystem functions, and adapt to climate 
change?118
However, overwhelming evidence shows that these crucial uses of 
the marine world are in danger. Under such circumstances, the depletion 
of fishery resources is not a crisis for food, but also a crisis for environ-
ment.
The history of high-seas fisheries management over the last 150 
years can be classified into three phases. The first phase, up until the ear-
ly 1970s, saw a rapid increase in both the number of fishing vessels op-
erating in the individual oceans and advances in technology which al-
lowed greater catches. The phase was characterized by generally narrow 
coastal State maritime zones and large areas of high seas. Also, a consid-
erable proportion of fisheries in the high seas fell under the jurisdiction 
of international or regional fishery commissions by the mid-1970s. The 
second phase, the period from the mid-1970s up until the early 1990s, 
reflected the developments and negotiations of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. Owing to the practices on claiming 
exclusive economic zone from countries, coastal states extended their ju-
risdiction out to 200 nautical miles so that many areas (and fisheries) that 
were previously classified as high seas came under national jurisdiction. 
 117.  United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) recognizes the term “food
security” as “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic 
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food prefer-
ences for an active and healthy life. (World Food Summit, 1996)” From the wording, it is well 
accepted that food security does not mean “enough” food but also “good” food. See FAO, Pol-
icy Brief, Issue 2 (June 2006). 
 118.  Serge M. Garcia and Andrew A. Rosenberg, “Food Security and Marine Capture 
Fisheries: Characteristics, Trends, Drivers and Future Perspectives,” Philosophical Transac-
tions Royal Society B, Vol. 365, No. 1554 (2010), pp. 2869–2880. 
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The area defined as high seas was thus considerably reduced and conse-
quently so was the area under the jurisdiction of regional and interna-
tional fisheries commissions. Since the mid-1990s, high-seas fisheries 
management has entered its third phase. This phase reflects the interna-
tional community’s concerns about overfishing in the high seas. Even 
greater emphasis has been placed on the international duties and respon-
sibilities of all nations in the conservation of ocean resources, as well as 
the importance of cooperation between States, both adjacent to the fish-
eries and those exploiting them.119
For the purposes of conserving and managing marine living re-
sources, traditional thought on utilization should be transformed to sus-
tainability. In order to reach this objective, “sustainable development” is 
one of the main policy bases. Sustainable development is the idea that 
“meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”120 Governments 
should take this position in making their fishery policy rather than con-
centrate on increasing fishing capacity or the amount of fishing, especial-
ly when the FAO reiterates the serious situation in the 1999 International 
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity.121
Following on the concept of sustainable development of fisheries, 
another consideration that should be taken when making policy on fisher-
ies is the “precautionary approach.”
Since the mid-1980s, the concept of precautionary approach was 
developed through regional legal instruments for the protection of the 
terrestrial, and subsequently marine, environment, and was finally en-
shrined in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration.122 It states: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary ap-
proach shall be widely applied by States according to their ca-
pabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent envi-
ronmental degradation. 
 119.  Sevaly Sen, “The Evolution of High-Seas Fisheries Management in the North-East 
Atlantic,” Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol. 35, Nos. 2-3 (1997), pp. 85-86. 
 120.  World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 43. 
 121.  Rosemary Rayfuse, “The Challenge of Sustainable High Seas Fisheries,” in Nico 
Schrijver and Friedl Weiss, eds., International Law and Sustainable Development: Principles 
and Practice, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004, pp. 469-477. 
 122.  Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), 12 August 1996. 
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Based on the precautionary approach, the UNFSA not only includes 
this approach as a kind of duty to co-operate,123 but also demands the 
application of the precautionary approach. This can be seen from Article 
6 of the UNFSA: 
1.   States shall apply the precautionary approach widely to 
conservation, management and exploitation of straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in order to 
protect the living marine resources and preserve the marine 
environment.
2.   States shall be more cautious when information is uncer-
tain, unreliable or inadequate. The absence of adequate 
scientific information shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing or failing to take conservation and management 
measures. 
3.   In implementing the precautionary approach, States shall: 
(a) improve decision-making for fishery resource conser-
vation and management by obtaining and sharing the 
best scientific information available and implementing 
improved techniques for dealing with risk and uncer-
tainty; . . . 
Such considerations even have to be applied when a natural phe-
nomenon has a significant adverse impact on the status of straddling fish-
ing stocks or highly migratory fish stocks. The exact language of Article 
6 of UNSFA states that “States shall adopt conservation and management 
measures on an emergency basis to ensure that fishing activity does not 
exacerbate such adverse impact” and that “States shall also adopt such 
measures on an emergency basis where fishing activity presents a serious 
threat to the sustainability of such stocks.”124
Policy assessment is one of the most important parts in a policy-
making circle. During the period of focusing on economic development 
and trading, exploring the marine living resources and increasing the 
production might be the right choice. However, under a globalized 
world, it is hard to distinguish the complicated web of influence between 
trade and environment. So is the fishery. Nonetheless, since we are in the 
phase of conserving and managing fishery resources, and international 
instruments and RFMOs have already embedded the concepts of sustain-
ability and precautionary into the fishing activities, then it might be the 
right time and right choice to adjust fisheries policy to a more environ-
mental deliberation. Moreover, States bordering semi-enclosed seas, such 
 123.  UNFSA, Article 5(c). 
 124.  UNFSA, Article 6(7). 
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as the South China Sea, should have responsibilities to embed the con-
sideration of regional cooperation into every party’s national ocean poli-
cy. Moreover, the goal of sustainable fisheries management in the South 
China Sea region is currently impeded by ill-organized management 
which originated from the disputes of maritime delimitation and territori-
al sovereignty issues. This could be a good opportunity for all claimants 
to the South China Sea islands to take sustainable fisheries management 
into serious consideration. 
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No. 4 - 1990 (99) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-10-9
The Taiwan Relations Act after Ten Years (Lori Fisler Damrosch),
27 pp. $3.00
No. 5 - 1990 (100) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-11-7
The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations (Hungdah
CHIU), 34 pp. (out of print) $4.00
No. 6 - 1990 (101) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-12-5
Taiwan’s Recent Elections:  Fulfilling the Democratic Promise (John F.
Copper), 174 pp. Index (out of print) $8.00
1991 Series
No. 1 - 1991 (102) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-13-3
Legal Aspects of Investment and Trade with the Republic of China (Ed-
ited by John T. McDermott, with contributions by Linda F. Powers,
Ronald A. Case, Chung-Teh LEE, Jeffrey H. Chen, Cheryl M.
Friedman, Hungdah CHIU, K.C. Fan and Douglas T. Hung), 94 pp.
$6.00
No. 2 - 1991 (103) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-14-1
Failure of Democracy Movement:  Human Rights in the People’s Re-
public of China, 1988/89 (Ta-ling LEE and John F. Copper), 150 pp.
Index $10.00
No. 3 - 1991 (104) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-15-X
Freedom of Expression:  The Continuing Revolution in Japan’s Legal
Culture (Lawrence W. Beer), 31 pp. $5.00
No. 4 - 1991 (105) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-16-8
The 1989 US-Republic of China (Taiwan) Fisheries Negotiations (Mark
Mon-Chang Hsieh), 84 pp. $6.00
No. 5 - 1991 (106) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-17-6
Politics of Divided Nations:  China, Korea, Germany and Vietnam —
Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political Development (Ed-
ited by Quansheng ZHAO and Robert Sutter), 198 pp. Index $12.00
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No. 6 - 1991 (107) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-18-4
Lawyers in China:  The Past Decade and Beyond (Timothy A. Gelatt),
49 pp. $5.00
1992 Series
No. 1 - 1992 (108) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-19-2
Judicial Review of Administration in the People’s Republic of China
(Jyh-pin FA & Shao-chuan LENG), 37 pp. $5.00
No. 2 - 1992 (109) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-20-6
China’s Ministry of State Security:  Coming of Age in the International
Arena (Nicholas Eftimiades), 24 pp. $4.00
No. 3 - 1992 (110) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-21-4
Libel Law and the Press in South Korea:  An Update (KYU Ho Youm),
23 pp. $5.00
No. 4 - 1992 (111) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-22-2
Tiananmen Aftermath:  Human Rights in the People’s Republic of
China, 1990 (John F. Copper and Ta-ling LEE), 133 pp.  Index $15.00
No. 5 - 1992 (112) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-23-0
The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (Revised ver-
sion of No. 1-1990 (96)) (Hungdah CHIU), 37 pp. $4.00
No. 6 - 1992 (113) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-24-9
China’s Criminal Justice System and the Trial of Pro-Democracy Dissi-
dents (Hungdah CHIU), 21 pp. $3.00
1993 Series
No. 1 - 1993 (114) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-25-7
Can One Unscramble an Omelet?  China’s Economic Reform in Theory
and Practice (Yuan-li WU and Richard Y. C. Yin), 34 pp. $4.00
No. 2 - 1993 (115) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-26-5
Constitutional Development and Reform in the Republic of China on
Taiwan (With Documents) (Hungdah CHIU), 61 pp. $6.00
No. 3 - 1993 (116) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-27-3
Sheltering for Examination (Shourong Shencha) in the Legal System of
the People’s Republic of China (Tao-tai HSIA and Wendy I.
Zeldin), 32 pp. $4.00
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No. 4 - 1993 (117) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-28-1
In Making China Modernized:  Comparative Modernization between
Mainland China and Taiwan (Wen-hui TSAI), 281 pp.  Index (out
of print, please order No. 5 - 1996 for 2nd ed.) $18.00
No. 5 - 1993 (118) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-30-3
Hong Kong’s Transition to 1997:  Background, Problems and Prospects
(with Documents) (Hungdah CHIU), 106 pp. $7.00
No. 6 - 1993 (119) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-31-1
Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and Stable
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (with Documents) (Hungdah
CHIU), 69 pp. $5.00
1994 Series
No. 1 - 1994 (120) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-32-X
Statutory Encouragement of Investment and Economic Development in
the Republic of China on Taiwan (Neil L. Meyers), 72 pp. $7.00
No. 2 - 1994 (121) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-33-8
Don’t Force Us to Lie:  The Struggle of Chinese Journalists in the Re-
form Era (Allison Liu Jernow), 99 pp. $7.00
No. 3 - 1994 (122) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-34-6
Institutionalizing a New Legal System in Deng’s China (Hungdah
CHIU), 44 pp. $5.00
No. 4 - 1994 (123) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-35-4
The Bamboo Gulag:  Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China,
1991-1992 (Ta-ling LEE & John F. Copper), 281 pp.  Index $20.00
No. 5 - 1994 (124) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-36-2
Taiwan’s Legal System and Legal Profession (Hungdah CHIU and
Jyh-pin FA), 22 pp. $3.00
No. 6 - 1994 (125) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-37-0
Toward Greater Democracy:  An Analysis of the Republic of China on
Taiwan’s Major Elections in the 1990s (Wen-hui TSAI), 40 pp. $6.00
1995 Series
No. 1 - 1995 (126) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-38-9
Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of Chile
(Herman Gutierrez B. and Lin CHOU), 31 pp. $5.00
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No. 2 - 1995 (127) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-39-7
The Tibet Question and the Hong Kong Experience (Barry Sautman
and Shiu-hing LO), 82 pp. $10.00
No. 3 - 1995 (128) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-40-0
Mass Rape, Enforced Prostitution, and the Japanese Imperial
Army:  Japan Eschews International Legal Responsibility?
(David Boling), 56 pp. $5.00
No. 4 - 1995 (129) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-41-9
The Role of the Republic of China in the World Economy (Chu-yuan
CHENG), 25 pp. $3.00
No. 5 - 1995 (130) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-42-7
China’s Economy after Deng:  A Long-Term Perspective (Peter C.Y.
Chow), 43 pp. $5.00
No. 6 - 1995 (131) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-43-5
An Entreprenurial Analysis of Opposition Movements (Ching-chane
HWANG), 179 pp. Index $18.00
1996 Series
No. 1 - 1996 (132) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-44-3
Taiwan’s 1995 Legislatiave Yuan Election (John F. Copper), 39 pp. $6.00
No. 2 - 1996 (133) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-45-1
Russian-Taiwanese Relations:  Current State, Problems, and Prospects
of Development (Peter M. Ivanov), 76 pp. $10.00
No. 3 - 1996 (134) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-46-X
Recent Relations between China and Taiwan and Taiwan’s Defense Ca-
pabilities (Hungdah CHIU & June Teufel Dreyer), 28 pp. $4.00
No. 4 - 1996 (135) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-47-8
Intellectual Property Protection in the Asian-Pacific Region:  A Com-
parative Study (Paul C. B. Liu & Andy Y. Sun), 183 pp. Index. $25.00
(Hardcover edition:  ISBN 0-925153-48-6) $32.00
No. 5 - 1996 (136) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-49-4
In Making China Modernized:  Comparative Modernization between
Mainland China and Taiwan (2nd ed.) (Wen-hui TSAI), 297 pp.
Index. $30.00
(Hardcover edition:  ISBN 0-925153-50-8) $37.00
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No. 6 - 1996 (137) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-51-6
A Study of the Consular Convention between the United States of
America and the People’s Republic of China (Stephen Kho), 68 pp.
$6.00
1997 Series
No. 1 - 1997 (138) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-52-4
Tiananmen to Tiananmen, China under Communism 1947-1996
(Yuan-Li WU), 348 pp.  Index $35.00
(Hardcover edition:  ISBN 0-925153-53-2) $45.00
No. 2 - 1997 (139) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-54-0
The External Relations and International Status of Hong Kong (TING
Wai), 72 pp. $8.00
No. 3 - 1997 (140) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-55-9
Sheltering for Examination (Shoushen) in the People’s Republic of
China:  Law, Policy, and Practices (Kam C. WONG), 53 pp. $6.00
No. 4 - 1997 (141) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-56-7
Legal Aid Practices in the PRC in the 1990s — Dynamics, Contents and
Implications, (LUO Qizhi) 68 pp. $8.00
No. 5 - 1997 (142) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-57-5
The KMT’s 15th Party Congress:  The Ruling Party at a Crossroads
(John F. Copper), 38 pp. $5.00
No. 6 - 1997 (143) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-58-3
From Pirate King to Jungle King:  Transformation of Taiwan’s Intellec-
tual Property Protection (Andy Y. Sun), 138 pp. $18.00
1998 Series
No. 1 - 1998 (144) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-59-1
From “Multi-System Nations” to “Linkage Communities”:  A New
Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations
(Yung WEI), 20 pp. $4.00
No. 2 - 1998 (145) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-60-5
The Impact of the World Trade Organization on the Lack of Trans-
parency in the People’s Republic of China (Stephen Kho), 63 pp.
$7.00
No. 3 - 1998 (146) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-61-3
The Nationalist Ideology of the Chinese Military (Xiaoyu CHEN), 45
pp. $6.00
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No. 4 - 1998 (147) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-62-1
Convergence and the Future of Reunification between Mainland China
and Taiwan:  A Developmental View (Wen-hui TSAI), 33 pp. $5.00
No. 5 - 1998 (148) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-63-X
Chinese Patent Law and Patent Litigation in China (Xiang WANG),
61 pp. $8.00
No. 6 - 1998 (149) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-64-8
The Development of Banking in Taiwan:  The Historical Impact on Fu-
ture Challenges (Lawrence L.C. Lee), 39 pp. $6.00
1999 Series
No. 1 - 1999 (150) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-65-6
An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the T’iaoyutai Islets
(Senkaku Gunto) (Hungdah CHIU), 27 pp. $6.00
No. 2 - 1999 (151) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-66-4
Taiwan’s 1998 Legislative Yuan, Metropolitan Mayoral and City Coun-
cil Elections:  Confirming and Consolidating Democracy in the Re-
public of China (John F. Copper), 53 pp. $7.00
No. 3 - 1999 (152) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-67-2
The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute:  Its History and an Analysis of
the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan
(Han-yi SHAW), 148 pp. (out of print) $20.00
No. 4 - 1999 (153) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-68-0
Election and Democracy in Hong Kong:  The 1998 Legislative Council
Election (Shiu-hing LO & Wing-yat YU), 68 pp. $9.00
No. 5 - 1999 (154) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-69-9
The ROC on the Threshold of the 21st Century:  A Paradigm Reexam-
ined (Edited by Chien-min CHAO & Cal Clark), 189 pp. $24.00
No. 6 - 1999 (155) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-70-2
Party Primaries in Taiwan:  Trends, Conditions, and Projections in Can-
didate Selection (Julian Baum and James A. Robinson), 39 pp. $6.00
2000 Series
No. 1 - 2000 (156) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-71-0
United States-Taiwan Relations:  Twenty Years after the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act (Edited by Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang & William W. Boyer),
309 pp. Index. $28.00
(Hardcover edition:  ISBN 0-925153-72-9) $42.00
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No. 2 - 2000 (157) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-73-7
Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election:  Consoli-
dating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics
(John F. Copper), 66 pp. $9.00
No. 3 - 2000 (158) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-74-5
Legal Eligibility of Taiwan’s Accession to GATT/WTO (CHO Hui-
Wan), 22 pp. $6.00
No. 4 - 2000 (159) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-75-3
Russia’s Northeast Asia Policy:  Challenges and Choices for the 21st
Century (Sharif M. Shuja), 22 pp. $6.00
No. 5 - 2000 (160) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-76-1
East Asia and the Principle of Non-Intervention:  Policies and Practices
(Linjun WU), 39 pp. $7.00
No. 6 - 2000 (161) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-77-X
The Association of South East Asian Nations’ Confidence and Security
Building with the People’s Republic of China:  Internal Constraints
and Policy Implications (Kwei-Bo HUANG), 61 pp. $9.00
2001 Series
No. 1 - 2001 (162) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-78-8
Socio-economic Changes and Modernization in an Age of Uncertainty:
Taiwan in the 1990s and Its Future Challenge (Wen-hui TSAI),
35 pp. $7.00
No. 2 - 2001 (163) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-79-6
Implementation of Taiwan Relations Act:  An Examination after
Twenty Years (Edited by Hungdah CHIU, Hsing-wei LEE and
Chih-Yu T. WU), 267 pp. $27.00
No. 3 - 2001 (164) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-80-X
The Diplomatic War between Beijing and Taipei in Chile (Lin CHOU),
61 pp. $9.00
No. 4 - 2001 (165) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-81-8
Reforming the Protection of Intellectual Property: The Case
of China and Taiwan in Light of WTO Accession
(Andy Y. Sun), 46 pp. $8.00
No. 5 - 2001 (166) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-82-6
Arbitration of Commercial Disputes in China (Vai Io LO), 26 pp. $6.00
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No. 6 - 2001 (167) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-83-4
Building a Democratic State in Modernizing Taiwan:  The 2001 Legisla-
tive Election and the Push for Pluralism (Wen-hui TSAI and
George P. Chen), 24 pp. $6.00
2002 Series
No. 1 - 2002 (168) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-84-2
United States and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea:  A Study
of Ocean Law and Politics (Yann-huei SONG), 321 pp. $35.00
No. 2 - 2002 (169) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-85-0
The Politics of Racial Discrimination in Hong Kong (Barry Sautman
and Ellen Kneehans), 83 pp. (out of print) $10.00
No. 3 - 2002 (170) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-00-3
The Social and Political Bases for Women’s Growing Political Power in
Taiwan (Cal Clark and Janet Clark), 40 pp. $7.00
No. 4 - 2002 (171) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-01-1
The U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement: A Bridge for Economic Inte-
gration in the Asia-Pacific Region (Peter C.Y. Chow), 62 pp. $9.00
2003 Series
No. 1 - 2003 (172) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-02-X
Bringing People Back In: Collected Essays on Major Elections in Tai-
wan at the Turn of the 21st Century (Wen-hui TSAI), 125 pp. $18.00
No. 2 - 2003 (173) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-03-8
Taiwan: The Commercial State (Arthur I. Cyr), 81 pp. (out of print,
please order No. 1 - 2005 (180) for a revised version of this issue)
$10.00
No. 3 - 2003 (174) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-04-6
New Rules to the Old Great Game:  An Assessment of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization’s Proposed Free Trade Zone (Leland
Rhett Miller), 25 pp. $6.00
No. 4 - 2003 (175) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-05-4
The Republic of China Legislative Yuan:  A Study of Institutional
Evolution (Thomas J. Bellows), 35 pp. $7.00
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2004 Series
No. 1 - 2004 (176) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-06-2
Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Demoracy’s
Consolidation or Devolution? (John F. Cooper), 80 pp. $10.00
No. 2 - 2004 (177) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-07-0
Peace, Reunification, Democracy and Cross-Strait Relations (Zhaohui
HONG and Yi SUN), 16 pp. $5.00
No. 3 - 2004 (178) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-08-9
Judicial Discretion in Dispensing with the Service of Process Require-
ment in Hong Kong under Order 45, Rule 7(7): Moving towards a
Doctrine? (Simon Teng), 27 pp. $7.00
No. 4 - 2004 (179) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-09-7
Taiwan’s 2004 Legislative Election:  Putting it in Perspective (John F.
Copper), 75 pp. $13.00
2005 Series
No. 1 - 2005 (180) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-10-0
Taiwan: The Commercial State (revised version of No. 2-2003 (173))
(Arthur I. Cyr), 81 pp. $13.00
No. 2 - 2005 (181) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-11-9
Retracing the Triangle: China’s Strategic Perceptions of Japan in the
Post-Cold War Era (Danielle F. S. Cohen), 74 pp. (out of print)
$13.00
No. 3 - 2005 (182) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-12-7
Putting Things into Perspective: The Reality of Accountability in East
Timor, Indonesia and Cambodia (Suzannah Linton), 90 pp. $13.00
No. 4 - 2005 (183) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-13-5
Taiwan and the Soviet Bloc, 1949-1991 (Czeslaw Tubilewicz), 85 pp. $13.00
2006 Series
No. 1 - 2006 (184) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-14-3
Japan’s Changing Security Policy: An Overall View (Sharif Shuja),
32 pp. $7.00
No. 2 - 2006 (185) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-15-1
China in ASEAN-LED Multilateral Forums (Serene Hung),
102 pp. $14.00
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No. 3 - 2006 (186) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-16-X
East Mountain Tiger, West Mountain Tiger: China, the West, and
“Colonialism” in Africa (Barry Sautman and YAN Hairong),
77 pp. (out of print) $13.00
No. 4 - 2006 (187) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-17-8
Taiwan’s 2006 Metropolitan Mayoral and City Council Elections and
the Politics of Corruption (John F. Copper), 65 pp. $12.00
2007 Series
No. 1 - 2007 (188) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-18-6
National Identity, Ethnic Identity, and Party Identity in Taiwan (Chang-
Yen TSAI), 34 pp. $8.00
No. 2 - 2007 (189) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-19-4
Combating Corruption Singapore-Style: Lessons for Other Asian Coun-
tries (Jon S.T. Quah), 56 pp. $12.00
No. 3 - 2007 (190) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-20-8
The Status of Customary International Law, Treaties, Agreements and
Semi-Official or Unofficial Agreements in Law of the Republic of
China on Taiwan (Hungdah CHIU and Chun-I CHEN), 31 pp. $8.00
No. 4 - 2007 (191) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-21-6
Rape Myths in American and Chinese Laws and Legal Systems: Do
Tradition and Culture Make the Difference? (Marietta Sze-chie
Fa), 109 pp. $16.00
2008 Series
No. 1 - 2008 (192) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-22-4
Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election:  Maturing
Democracy (John F. Copper), 90 pp. $15.00
No. 2 - 2008 (193) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-23-2
The Political Economy of South Korea:  Economic Growth, Democrati-
zation, and Financial Crisis (Uk HEO, Houngcheul JEON, Hayam
KIM and Okjin KIM), 24 pp. $7.00
No. 3 - 2008 (194) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-24-0
Korean Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Security, Economics, or
International Law? (Terence Roehrig), 59 pp. $12.00
No. 4 - 2008 (195) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-25-9
Evolving On-Line Empowerment: The Manchu Identity Revival Since
the 1980s (BAI Lian), 48 pp. $10.00
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2009 Series
No. 1 - 2009 (196) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-26-7
Taiwan at a Turning Point (Edited by Seyom Brown, Cal Clark, Hiroki
Takeuchi, and Alex Tan), 98 pp. $18.00
No. 2 - 2009 (197) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-27-5
The Background, Principles and Core Contents of the Real Right Law
of The People’s Republic of China (ZHU Yan), 39 pp. (out of
print) $8.00
No. 3 - 2009 (198) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-28-3
“All that Glitters Is Not Gold”: Tibet as a Pseudo-State (Barry
Sautman), 86 pp. $15.00
No. 4 - 2009 (199) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-29-1
Positive Equilibrium in U.S.-China Relations: Durable or Not? A time
of “testing” in Sino-American Relations (Robert Sutter), 52 pp.
$12.00
2010 Series
No. 1 - 2010 (200) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-30-5
An Insight into Insider Trading in Greater China (Greg Tzu Jan Yang),
61 pp. $14.00
No. 2 - 2010 (201) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-31-3
Taiwan’s Anti-Corruption Strategy: Suggestions for Reform (Jon S.T.
Quah), 111 pp. $18.00
No. 3 - 2010 (202) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-32-1
The East Asia Summit and the Regional Security Architecture (Ralf
Emmers, Joseph Chinyong Liow, and See Seng TAN), 52 pp. $12.00
No. 4 - 2010 (203) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-33-X
Taiwan’s 2010 Metropolitan City Elections: An Assessment of Taiwan’s
Politics and a Predictor of Future Elections (John F. Copper),
67 pp. $15.00
2011 Series
No. 1 - 2011 (204) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-34-8
Legal Aid and the Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China
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